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I. INTRODUCTION
Last fall a Symposium at Chicago-Kent College of Law entitled
"Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: The Role of
National Courts," held on October 18-19, 2001, brought together
scholars interested in a group of problems related to the relationship
between harmonized rules of international civil procedure and di-
verse nationally-based rules of intellectual property. Subsequently,
extensive discussions between the authors developed this Article into
its present form.
A. Background and History of the Convention
The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters' has had a long and tumultu-
1. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The latest draft is
entitled Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the
Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001, Interim Text, available at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/
jurisdiction/Interimtext.rtf (last visited June 23, 2002), reprinted in this issue at 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1015 [hereinafter Hague Convention, 2001 Draft]; the previous draft from 1999 is also
20021
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ous history.2 The concerns of the Convention are, first, jurisdiction
over defendants in a country that is "foreign" to the defendant (if not
also the plaintiff); and second, enforcement of judgments in the
courts of a country other than the one that entered the judgment.
These focuses indicate a litigation-centered worldview.
People who care about the terms of the Hague Convention envi-
sion having a civil cause of action (or having clients who have one)
against a person they wish to sue in a country that is foreign to that
person. If the outcome of the suit is not settlement, dismissal or loss,
they want to be able to enforce that judgment in yet another foreign
country. If that seems like a remote scenario for most of humanity
most of the time, it is. For that reason (among others, perhaps), the
Hague Convention has not been on the top of very many people's
priority list.3 The importance of the Hague Convention, however,
available online at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last visited August 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Hague Convention, 1999 Draft]. The 2001 draft is far more confusing, as it is full of
bracketed language and multiple variants of the same section. In many cases, the 1999 draft is
more illustrative. When discussing specific language used in either draft we will refer to them
by date. We will also speak of "the Hague Convention" without a date as a useful shorthand for
the general concept of a non-IP-specific convention covering foreign jurisdiction and
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Such a time-general term is needed when
discussing prospective changes or ideas for modifying the existing drafts.
2. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New
Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 282-84 (1994). For a
discussion of more recent events, see Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on.
Private International Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recog-
nition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 8
(1998), and Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention
on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 467, 490-92.
3. For official documents related to the recent drafts illustrating the substantial changes
between drafts, see http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. For additional unofficial
documents, see http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/hague.html. The previous draft is
available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last visited June 23, 2002). The
latest news on the future of the Convention as of the final draft is:
With regard to the project of elaborating a Convention on Jurisdiction,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(the Judgments Project), the delegations unanimously reconfirmed the great
importance they attach to harmonising rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters on a worldwide basis. The
delegations encouraged the Conference to continue to pursue common solutions for
these issues in the area of private international law, especially given the increasing
need for finding solutions in this difficult arena.
The Commission agreed that the best path forward on the Judgments Project at
this point would be to have the Secretariat convene an informal working group and
facilitate and conduct a transparent and flexible working process with a view to
preparing a text to be submitted to a Special Commission during the first half of 2003.
The Special Commission would then be followed by a Diplomatic Conference which
would be held, if possible, by the end of 2003. Based on a paper to be prepared by the
Permanent Bureau, the starting point for this informal process will be a discussion of a
core area of possible grounds of jurisdiction as tentatively identified by the
Commission, as well as the existing provisions on recognition and enforcement upon
(Vol. 77:1213
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goes well beyond what happens in courts: what is included, what is
omitted, and how things are phrased in it, have a strong potential to
chill certain activities and encourage others, because of fears of risks,
or even of certainties, about lawsuits.
B. The Alternative Proposal of Dreyfuss and Ginsburg
The Hague Convention is of broad and inclusive scope, covering
most of civil commercial litigation.4 By contrast, the proposal drafted
by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg5 deals exclusively
with "intellectual property"6 (with the intention of excluding pat-
ents).7 Its real thrust is copyright. This narrower scope permits the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal to more precisely address the specific
concerns of copyright owners and other web actors who may have
which there is broad agreement. This core area might include choice of court
agreements, defendant's forum, counter-claims, branches, submission, trusts and
physical injury torts.
Commission I on General Affairs and Policy held on 22-24 April 2002, The Conclusions of
Commission I (General Affairs and Policy of the Conference) of the XIXth Diplomatic
Session-April 2002, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/genaff.html (last visited June
23, 2002) (web page provides link to Microsoft Word document).
4. See discussion infra Section II.B.
5. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1065 (2002)
[hereinafter Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention]. To avoid confusion between the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg Draft Convention and the draft Hague Convention, we sometimes refer to the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention as the proposal. When discussing points the two have in
common, we refer to them jointly as the conventions or the proposals.
6. The term "intellectual property" should logically be restricted to matters that concern
at least the three major areas, patents, copyright and trademark. It may also cover matters that
concern secondary intellectual property-like areas: chips, databases, trade dress, right of
personality, etc. We have attempted to avoid use of the phrase "intellectual property" when
copyright is the real concern, or where, more generally, readers who mentally substitute for the
genus the name of one of the species (patent, trademark or copyright) might reasonably be
confused or disbelieving.
7. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, art. 1.1:
The Convention applies to copyright, neighboring rights, [patents,] trademarks,
other intellectual property rights, and rights against unfair competition, as covered by
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, and its successor
Agreements. In addition, this Convention applies to rights over communication to the
public of Sound Recordings and to claims involving domain names.
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1074. The brackets around the word
"patents" reflect that preference to omit patent litigation from the scope of the Convention. See
id. at 1068 (Executive Summary, § 1). See also the "Commentary" concerning "Arts. 1 and 2.
Substantive and Territorial Scope," which says:
(b) Exceptions.
There are three exceptions to the general rule that the Convention covers TRIPs
rights: patents, which are excluded, and rights of communication to the public in sound
recordings, rights covered only in the Paris Convention, and domain names, which are
included.
Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
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disputes over possibly copyright-protected material. In addition, by
requiring signatories to be countries that have adopted TRIPs,8 varia-
tions in substantive law among member countries becomes a more
tractable problem than it is under the more broadly framed Hague
Convention.
C. Some Observations
1. The Internet
The web is unquestionably one of the factors responsible for the
recent increase in interest in the language and scope of an interna-
tional convention on foreign jurisdiction and enforcement. It there-
fore may be instructive to consider how the Internet is different from
the technologies that preceded it. Certainly, information can be
moved faster and more cheaply via the web than ever before. (And
there will no doubt be even faster and cheaper methods in the future,
as unimaginable to us as the web would have been to almost anyone
thirty or forty years ago.)
Perhaps the most significant difference between the Internet and
everything that came before it is that the web permits decentralized
distribution of anything that can be digitized, without the constraints
of physical distribution.9 This is vital for issues such as jurisdiction:
once something can be sent to anyone on earth who has a computer
8. For example, see the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention's Executive Summary, Item
1, and "Preliminary Matters: coverage." Id. at 1068, 1073; see also Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 J.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
9. Information delivery systems can be compared based on the speed at which the
message is received, the ability to deliver the message regardless of the form or content of the
message in its physical embodiment, and the ability to do so despite obstacles and barriers to
delivery placed by the intended recipient or third parties. The differences may not always be
apparent. For example, from one's office, one can use mail, telephone, or E-mail to convey
birthday greetings or the latest directive from headquarters, and the message will generally be
received whether the recipient is next-door or halfway around the world. E-mail combines
flexibility and openness because the sender can send all types of digitized content without being
stopped at the borders crossed by physical mail. Paper mail will take longest and may have to
go through customs or other screening. Telephone, until relatively recently, was only good for
messages that were audible. Nowadays, of course, with faxes and modems, the telephone is not
so limited at the sender's end. It still can encounter problems at the recipient's end, such as by
control of the telephone lines by governments, answering machines, or human telephone
answerers. Digitization, independent of the creation of the Internet, is responsible for much of
the difference people perceive about the web. Digital communication over the Internet has
another dimension, however, that digital telephones (by themselves) lack: more types of
communication can be sent than ever before and more recipients can be reached, and reached
concurrently, than ever before.
[Vol. 77:1213
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and a network connection, there is not much need for physically dis-
tributed warehouses and sales forces, thereby eliminating one tradi-
tional way of determining whether a particular country can assert
jurisdiction. Although a business that conveys physical goods may
need brick-and-mortar stores and warehouses if it wants to succeed,
the fact remains that a distribution to people in hundreds of different
nations instantaneously requires neither. What may be revolutionary
is that never before have so many people been exposed to liability in
so many places by doing so little to reach (and knowing nothing
about) those places.
This broad exposure to liability will affect large and small entities
differently. Large entities can more effectively research the law of
foreign countries. This gives them an advantage over those who do
not have the resources to determine whether their activities will make
them liable to someone somewhere. Additionally, in cases of great
uncertainty but great "upside potential," better-capitalized firms may
be more able, and more willing, to insulate themselves from risk
through insurance or self-insurance. Then, too, large entities are
more likely to have assets in numerous jurisdictions. This suggests
that they may view foreign enforcement as a sword, rather than as
something from which they need a shield. But smaller entities do in-
novate, and their contributions may be stifled if they are foreclosed
from the Internet, E-commerce, and the latest technologies by reason
of a too-harsh system of foreign jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments. These ideas are addressed more fully in Part III below.
2. Differences between Types of "Intellectual Property"
The Hague Convention must balance the rights of potential
plaintiffs with those of potential defendants. These are mostly non-
overlapping groups in the standard picture of web-related litigation: it
is generally assumed that actors who are plaintiffs are rarely defen-
dants, and vice versa. The concepts of a plaintiff's bar and defense
bar apply if a copyright cause of action is imagined: owners of
copyright-protected material are pitted against users who have no
copyright-protected material of their own. Of course, one competitor
may sue its arch rival, or big companies in different industries who
contract with each other may have reason to sue each other, but the
typical litigation picture for a web-based suit is not one between, say,
AOL Time-Warner and Disney-ABC. In defamation and right-to-
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privacy suits, too, entities likely to be plaintiffs are not likely to be de-
fendants, and vice versa.
Trademarks, and especially patents, may have less well-defined
plaintiff and defendant groups. For trademark and trade dress, tradi-
tional rivals may sue each other, but, as with copyright, the alleged in-
fringer is probably more likely to be a smaller or newer entity, such as
a cybersquatter or a piggybacker on a well-known company's marks.
Patent law is even farther along the spectrum: today's patent owner
can easily be tomorrow's accused infringer, and vice versa. That is
because all the players generally have their own patents, or can ac-
quire some for leverage purposes when faced with a big lawsuit.
Even an inventor who never practices the patent and only wants to
license it must be concerned with the effect that other people's pat-
ents might have in discouraging potential licensees (including defen-
dants after suit has been commenced) or reducing the perceived value
of the license. These conditions are likely to apply to "business
method" patents, as well as patents related to hardware and software
components. A more significant difference between patents and reg-
istered trademarks, on the one hand, and all other intellectual prop-
erty, on the other, may be that the former have "nationality" -a
country of registration or issuance. They embody rights granted by a
sovereign and as such they are only cognizable within that country.
This fact may alleviate much of the need for an international conven-
tion on jurisdiction and enforcement.10
Copyright is somewhat different because of the Berne Conven-
tion." Under Berne, once a work is protected by copyright in one
country, it is protected in all, subject to national treatment limitations
on true uniformity. For works that are translated into different spo-
ken languages, there may be some intrinsic nationality to the copy-
right, but for a host of other things-music, art, source code, etc.-the
concept of nationality for copyright protection may be becoming
10. Consider a French company with both a US and a French patent licensing to a US
company under the US patent. The license specifies that any disputes must be tried in French
courts. If the US company fails to pay royalties, it can be sued for infringement under US law.
If that suit is brought in France (as it would have to be by contract), the French court would, in
theory, have to consider the language of US statutes and of the regulations of the US Patent and
Trademark Office, defenses such as invalidity and unenforceability (inequitable conduct), and
enhancement of damages for willfulness and an award of attorney fees as permitted by US
statutes. An international convention stating that courts "must" give effect to such choices of
forum would likely not find favor with the judges who would have to preside over such cases.
11. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 (amended 1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
[Vol. 77:1213
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rather feeble. Thus, copyright suits may well be a focus of attention
in the drafting of a convention, and one for which the rules, rather
than any exceptions, are intended.
Secondary forms of intellectual property, such as trade dress and
trade secrets, also may have a national quality, as do forms of sui
generis intellectual property that are uniquely recognized in only one
or a few countries: anti-circumvention,12 database legislation in the
EU,13 and other niche rights in numerous other jurisdictions. But
such rights may be the very ones for which foreign enforcement, after
vindication in the owner's home location, is most sought. Foreign en-
forcement in such cases may be the only way to collect, too, because
the existence of defendant assets in the owner's home location may
be rather unlikely (at least compared to, say, a patent suit). Thus,
these kinds of suits may be more in the mind's eye of convention
drafters, and with more reason, than the more universal kinds of in-
tellectual property.
Whether an international convention on jurisdiction and en-
forcement is framed broadly or directed to intellectual property, the
drafters will have to consider how the differences among the kinds of
intellectual property rights affect litigation of those rights. While this
Article attempts neither to catalog those differences nor to address
them systematically, their existence suggests that the task of drafting
the Hague Convention is extraordinarily complicated.
The focus of this Article is, first, to explore why the importance
of any international convention on jurisdiction and enforcement may
be shrinking rapidly, as web actors find alternatives to, or are forced
to do without, litigation as a way to obtain redress for civil wrongs.
12. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (at 17
U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1322 (West Supp. 2000) and 24 U.S.C. § 4001) [hereinafter
DMCA].
13. As this Article was being completed, the Wired website published a news story on the
precedential influence a German court's ruling on Internet search engine "deep linking" might
have on EU law:
Using a search engine to locate stories on newspapers' sites violates European
Union law, according to a recent ruling by judges in Munich's Upper Court.
The ruling is the latest legal decision in a two-year battle between German
newspaper Mainpost and German search service NewsClub. Mainpost charges that
NewsClub violated the law by searching through and linking directly to Mainpost
content....
[Liegal experts believe that if the ruling is upheld, it could easily become a firm
legal precedent across the European Union, drastically limiting the information that
many European search engines are allowed to provide to their users.
Michelle Delio, Deep Linking Takes Another Blow, July 25, 2002, at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,54083,00.html. The report indicates that the suit is for copyright infringe-
ment and the plaintiff, Mainpost, is seeking a quarter-of-a-million euros in damages.
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Next, assuming that a convention remains a necessity, regardless of its
shrinking realm, this Article will address the values that should guide
those drafting an ideal convention. Last, specific sections of the most
recent drafts of the Hague Convention and of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal dealing with jurisdiction, choice of law, enforcement, and
the special case of contracts, will be reviewed.
II. WHY NONE OF THIS MATTERS: WHY AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT (RESTRICTED
TO WEB-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION OR NOT) MAY BE
UNIMPORTANT
A. Introduction
People who make decisions about doing or continuing to do
business, make purchases, or offer or obtain services have a host of
immediate concerns. These decisions are often tied to quality, quan-
tity, cost, time of delivery, and other concrete aspects of the transac-
tion. Determining what will happen if something goes wrong is
usually a secondary concern. Thus, a system for resolving disputes
through civil litigation, no matter how intelligently constructed or
well regarded, is not the most important thing affecting initial deci-
sion making or preferences.14 Still, civilized people generally sub-
scribe to the notion that a judicial system for dispute resolution is a
good thing, much better than decision by physical contest or war.
Today, judicial systems are largely constrained by their geo-
graphical borders, but the web is making the whole concept of bor-
ders a little peculiar, if not obsolete. The draft Hague Convention
and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, both of which concern jurisdic-
tion over non-nationals in a national court, and enforcement of judg-
ments rendered by courts of other nations, are premised on the idea
that civil litigation is important, and that enhancing the credibility and
flexibility of litigating in other countries is a worthwhile endeavor.
It may be worthwhile, but how much? Civil litigation, particu-
larly for web-related activities, is being marginalized by a variety of
phenomena. Some are immune, untouchable, by any international
convention on jurisdiction and enforcement. Others might be dis-
14. If foreign litigation and enforcement of judgments were a primary focus of those
involved in distributing information or even physical goods, the pressure to conclude the Hague
Convention negotiations would be far greater.
[Vol. 77:1213
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couraged, or, if they are deemed to be for the common good, encour-
aged, by an appropriately drafted Convention. These phenomena
include: 1) inroads on tort and contract law: Private parties can avoid
possible tort litigation by drafting contracts, and they can avoid civil
litigation of their contracts by including a provision for alternate dis-
pute resolution, which could be mandatory and binding; 2) Criminali-
zation of torts: Public parties (governments) can declare certain
conduct criminal and can, in some cases, permit nonprofit associa-
tions to stand in the shoes of the government in prosecuting those
crimes; 3) Technological prevention of torts and breaches of contract:
In the case of web-related activities, there are technological "end-
runs" that content owners 15 and distributors may devise to thwart ac-
tivities that are undesirable to the content owners, but for which there
might be no clear civil liability. Governments, too, can use technol-
ogy in such a way that private disputes and dissent are minimized or
controlled; 4) Non-participation: Governments can choose not to sign
on to an international convention on jurisdiction and enforcement.
Then their very existence, as well as their actions and omissions, can
affect activities that were supposed to be controlled in some sense by
the convention; and 5) Creation of non-national courts.
We begin, then, by examining the phenomena that might render
any convention less important, particularly in the context of copy-
right, than it might first appear. Underlying this investigation is a de-
sire to identify: areas where a convention would nevertheless retain
its relevance, areas that might be improved by an ideal convention,
and unConventional (literally) methods to enhance the legal frame-
work for a highly interconnected world with ever-decreasing transac-
tion costs.
B. Alternatives to Civil Lawsuits: Alternative Dispute Resolution
The draft Hague Convention addresses civil litigation. It ex-
cludes a few types of claims,16 mostly having to do with interpersonal
15. The term "content owners" is used here as shorthand for those who claim a property
interest in something on the web, whether it is a copyright, trademark, domain-name, trade
dress, right of personality, database, or otherwise.
16. Hague, art. 1.2 (1999 Draft):
2. The Convention does not apply to-
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;
b) maintenance obligations;
c) matrimonial property regimes and other rights and obligations arising out of
marriage or similar relationships;
d) wills and succession;
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or family matters. But one exception does affect commercial matters:
arbitration. That could be construed as a loophole, and possibly as
something that will decrease the importance of any international con-
vention on jurisdiction and enforcement.
Tort and contract claims likely to arise in a commercial context
are otherwise covered, at least in theory. But in practice they might
escape the Convention. First, contract claims can--by the terms of
the contract-be removed from judicial resolution and delivered to
the world of arbitration. Second, tort claims can be converted into
contract claims, at least when there is a preexisting relationship, by
making what would have been an outright sale into a lease or license.
The second factor will be discussed here first.
1. The Contractualization of Torts
The contractualization of torts may well circumvent some of the
major benefits of the Hague Convention.17 The tort of copyright in-
fringement is an obvious example of a tort becoming contractualized.
Owners of a copyright-protected work who prefer not to rely on do-
mestic infringement laws have an alternative: they can grant licenses
instead of making sales. Licenses may have immediate economic and
business advantages over outright sales, in addition to the litigation
benefit.18 Licensing contracts, of course, can be subject to Hague
rules, but if the drafters have any concern about the vagaries of litiga-
tion, they may draft a provision that prevents disputes from reaching
the courts.
One of the fundamental benefits of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg pro-
posal over the draft Hague Convention is that it addresses a subset of
such contracts, those that are, in the phrase of that proposal, nonne-
e) insolvency, composition or analogous proceedings;
.) social security;
g) arbitration and proceedings related thereto;
h) admiralty or maritime matters.
Hague Convention, 1999 Draft, supra note 1, art 1.2. The 2001 Draft adds a host of new
exceptions in brackets for subsequent discussion, including most provisional and protective
measures and antitrust claims.
17. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted
Harms, 11 DUKE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165 (2001); Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman,
Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation
for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1993).
18. The movement toward licensing rather than selling began before the web was a large
presence, arguably as a response to the judicially created first sale doctrine. See Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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gotiated contracts.19 On the web, the most commonly encountered
nonnegotiated contract may be what is known as a clickwrap li-
cense. 20 By directly addressing jurisdiction and enforcement of such
contracts, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal seeks to balance, on the
one hand, the benefits both sides derive when a contract governs their
interactions, and, on the other hand, the detriments to licensees from
a clickwrap license. Thus, it has the potential to encourage the use of
contracts to improve the position of both parties relative to existing
tort law, while at the same time it may be able to avoid routinely vali-
dating clauses that unjustifiably benefit licensors. Depending on how
the content owners respond to having a convention that may overrule
the terms of nonnegotiated contracts, a Hague Convention incorpo-
rating this aspect of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal could give the
Convention a stronger reason for being.
On the other hand, the contractualization of torts, whether by
clickwrap contracts for copyright owners or otherwise, could mean a
massive flight of tort disputes from the court system if those contracts
specify alternative dispute resolution, the subject of the next Section.
2. Contractual Provisions Preventing Disputes from Reaching the
Courts
Any contract that specifies alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
does not need an international convention on jurisdiction and en-
forcement of foreign judgments. This is so whether or not the parties
or the activity are of different nations or no nation at all. Some po-
tential defendants may seek to have the contract nullified or re-
formed by a court, and so commence judicial proceedings as
plaintiffs. Those cases may then invoke the Hague Convention.21
The vast majority of disputes over contracts specifying ADR, how-
ever, never reach the courts, and so will not be affected by what the
Hague Convention does or does not say.
Given that the party drafting the contract can choose the method
of dispute resolution, it is likely that a pro-drafter method will be cho-
sen, if one is available. To the extent that mandatory arbitration fa-
vors the drafter of the contract, it is likely to be chosen in lieu of the
19. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1103.
20. More specific comments about these Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal provisions are
discussed at infra, Section IV.D.
21. Special problems under the Hague Convention for declaratory judgment actions are
discussed infra, Subsection IV.A.2.
2002)
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judicial system. This places the other party at a disadvantage that
might not be present in the court system. Since "arbitration and pro-
ceedings related thereto" are excluded from the scope of the Hague
Convention, this in and of itself makes the Hague Convention poten-
tially less relevant than it would otherwise be.22
Arbitration commenced under a contract negotiated between
equals differs from that arising out of a contract between parties of
fundamentally different power and means. The former will employ a
fairly balanced set of procedural and substantive rules, such as those
for picking the arbitrators, determining which law will apply to the
transaction, and which side will bear which costs. The latter, as the
product of unilateral drafting, may not. The drafters of such an arbi-
tration provision are free to define the method of dispute resolution,
and when there is a choice between dispute resolution services, they
are most likely to choose the one that offers them the greatest chance
of success. If a service is seen as favoring defendants (the nondrafting
side) more than its peers do, it is likely to go out of business.23 Addi-
tionally, if the dispute resolution is in a specific area, such as credit
card chargebacks,24 the drafters become repeat players and gain addi-
tional knowledge of how to manipulate the process. The nondrafters
rarely understand the underlying rules of the game at the start, and
are not likely to be repeat players.
C. Technological "End-Runs"
Technological "end-runs" provide alternatives to litigation not
limited to purely web-related activities. For example, a car could
cease to work if its payment schedule were not met.25 But the more
22. The 2001 Hague Draft includes the following bracketed language:
Art. 1.3. This Convention shall not apply to arbitration and proceedings related
thereto, nor shall it require a Contracting State to recognise and enforce a judgment if
the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of origin was contrary to an arbitration
agreement.
Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 1.3.
Thus, there would be no requirement to enforce a judgment if the contract required arbitration
without recourse to the legal system.
23. Michael Geist, Cyberlaw, Domain Dispute Bias Goes from Bad to Worse, GLOBE &
MAIL, Mar. 7, 2002, B17 ("Montreal-based eResolution Inc.... closed its doors for good in
December because it could not compete with rivals that tended to favour complainants.")
24. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for
New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675 (2000).
25. John Elliott, Onboard Spy Gives Rental Firms Remote Control over Hire Cars, Sunday
Times--London, September 9, 2001, at 7. This area is often called telematics.
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familiar examples do relate to the web, and in particular to situations
where there is material believed to be protected by copyright.
1. By Content Owners-Encryption and Other Technological
Solutions
Those who launch products or services into the stream of E-
commerce can encrypt them or otherwise prevent them from being
used in ways inconsistent with what the launcher desires. A general
term for such preventive mechanisms is digital rights management
systems or DRM. For example, a CD could be made to be unplay-
able on a certain type of computer, 26 or playable but not copyable, or
playable only a limited number of times. These technological solu-
tions to undesirable user acts expand the content owners' power be-
yond those rights recognized by legislatures or courts. They also act
as prior restraints, freeing the content owners from having to act af-
firmatively to stop conduct by resort to the judicial system or ADR.
This is an advantage whether or not the user would have incurred li-
ability for those acts. Instead, the burden of challenging the techno-
logical limitations is placed on the users' shoulders. They must
initiate suit (or ADR, if the launcher has also used contractualization
and an ADR clause)27 to obtain or regain the missing or blocked fea-
tures.
For example, suppose a business purchases an encrypted E-book
in the US, and the encryption software prevents a display of the E-
book on any computer other than the one to which it was first down-
loaded. The seller may harm its own market for the E-book, but it
has certainly found a way to abrogate the first sale doctrine of copy-
right law.28 While this result could be reached through lobbying and
legislative changes, or by contract, the technological method may of-
26. Stephen A. Booth, Access Denied!: How the Recording Industry's New Copy-Protection
Schemes Could Keep You from Your Music, SOUND & VISION ONLINE ("Sony DADC says 10
million discs comprising 500 albums have been released with its key2audio system, which
prevents PC playback or copying.") (last visited August 20, 2002).
27. See infra Section I.B.
28. The first sale doctrine was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act as 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
Audible.com, an online retailer of downloadable audio books, currently uses a technology
similar in purpose and implementation to the one discussed here. Before purchasing an audio
book, a customer must create a password-protected account at the Audible.com website. Each
audio book electronic file is encrypted in the site's proprietary format so that even after
purchase, the user may only play or manage (e.g., download to a portable audio player) a file
using Audible.com's proprietary software. The technology built into the software tracks on
which computer the user's account is installed and permits the user to play or manage files on
that computer only. See generally www.audible.com.
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fer the best combination of low cost and high likelihood of enforce-
ability. Under US law, it would be impermissible to break the
encryption.29 If the sale was fashioned as a license agreement it might
also be a breach of contract to do so. And if the contract specified
ADR, no court might ever have an opportunity to consider the mat-
ter.
In any case, an international convention addressing court-based
resolution of disputes based on technologically constrainable works
could be forced into early retirement if technological means can com-
pletely prevent much of the behavior that otherwise might have be-
come the subject of litigation. Right now, the technological solutions
are becoming more sophisticated and more protected by govern-
ments. 30 And while few people have the technological ability to
break the "locks," the few who can, wherever they do their work, are
able to distribute the keys globally in an instant. Transborder en-
forcement might then, at least in the short run, become more impor-
tant. But again, given the speed of distribution, content owners
would probably respond technologically, inventing better encryption
rather than abandoning technology in favor of litigation and arbitra-
tion.
The Hague Convention may, nevertheless, continue to have an
important role. First, such technological locks may meet with wide-
spread disfavor in the marketplace and (or because) competitors offer
similar products lock free. Second (and even less likely), govern-
ments in some countries might outlaw the use of locks,31 whether to
further access to information or to become a haven for copyright in-
fringement and other things.32
29. Supra note 12. Under the DMCA, it is possible that such a lock might be permissible
and not legally circumventable even when the underlying work is in the public domain, thereby
defeating the entire point of having a public domain.
30. Id. In addition, the United States Trade Representative is promoting DMCA-style
legislation overseas through the threat of Super 301 designation. See http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
ftaadraft/eng/drafte.doc for the export of the DMCA in the Free Trade in the Americas
Agreement.
31. For example, foreign countries might consider violating copyright law for educational
use acceptable, even if it is not permissible in a business context. Malaysian Domestic Trade
and Consumer Affairs Minister Muhyiddin Yassin was quoted as saying, "[F]or educational
purposes and to encourage computer usage, we may consider allowing schools and social
organisations to use pirated software." Malaysia Says It May Allow Pirated Software in Schools
at http://sg.tech.yahoo.com/reuters/asia-117456.html (last visited July 29, 2002); see also John
Leyden, Malays in Software Piracy Malaise, REGISTER, July 29, 2002, at http://www.
theregister.co.uk/content/4/26423.html.
32. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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2. By Content Users-Self-Running Peer-to-Peer Networks
Users, too, may have some weapons to place themselves outside
the court system. For example again using copyright infringement as
the cause of action of interest, users might establish peer-to-peer net-
works33 that do not have a home country.34 If the creators of the net-
work are not interested in making money from it (such as from
advertising) a network could be constructed so that once it was initi-
ated, it would operate without subsequent human control and without
a particular computer acting as server or controlling or monitoring
the process in any way. It could even be self-sustaining and mutating.
The desires of copyright owners to sue a major distributor or deep
pocket and obtain an injunction (if not damages) would be stymied.35
3. By Governments-National Filters
An international convention on jurisdiction and enforcement
might be unimportant for web-related activities if governments be-
come the only Internet service provider ("ISP"). ISPs are the con-
duits that help convey the digital information from the site that stores
the information to the site that requests it. If governments become
the ISPs for their national populations, they could limit and monitor
the transactions in which their citizens can participate. This is already
happening in some countries.36 If whole nations of consumers and
businesses are eliminated from large sectors of the web, the need for
33. Peer-to-peer networks do not have a centralized server that can be shut down to
disable the service. Instead, content providers are linked to content consumers though a
potentially vast network of smaller computers. Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are much like the
interstate highway system, where closing one highway does not affect most traffic and for those
affected, there are often detours that permit you to get where you want to go. Such networks
could be created for socially beneficial uses, such as sharing scholarly articles or public domain
works. Subsequent modifications might, however, be viewed by copyright owners as tortious.
See Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Defends MusicCity Peer-to-Peer
Technology, November 6, 2001, at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-vGrokster/20011106_eff_
musiccity-pr.html.
34. John Borland, File-Swapping Case May Break New Ground, Nov. 6, 2001, at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-275465.html?tag=rn (last visited June 24, 2002); SOFTWARE & INFO.
INDUS. ASS'N, STRETCHING THE FABRIC OF THE NET: EXAMINING THE PRESENT AND
POTENTIAL OF PEER-TO-PEER TECHNOLOGIES (2001), available at http://www.siia.net/shared
content/piracy/pubs/peerll0l.pdf (last visited June 24, 2002).
35. This concern has been partially addressed by a recent bill that would permit content
owners to hack peer-to-peer networks. At the time this issue went to press, the bill still lacked a
number, but the most current version is posted online at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/
berman.coble.p2p.final.072502.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Documentation of Internet Filtering
in Saudi Arabia, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia/ (last visited
August 20, 2002).
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an international convention will decrease. If those nations are, or be-
come, important in world trade as consumers, that decrease could be
significant.
D. Criminal Law
A substantial amount of concern about the Hague Convention
has centered on the differences among the nations with respect to
copyright laws and freedom of speech. Interestingly, these are both
areas in which activities that previously were (merely) actionable by
private parties are now being subject to criminal sanctions.37 Copy-
right infringement in many countries now may subject the infringer to
criminal penalties. There is also an increasing trend towards crimi-
nalizing different types of speech, including hate speech, political
speech, and other types of speech. The laws providing for criminal
penalties apply not only to the speaker, but also to the conduits, such
as newspapers 38 and websites.
If a website is accessible to hundreds of jurisdictions, it could be-
come subject to hundreds of criminal laws. The Hague Convention
does not touch on such things. This means that even if the nonen-
forcement provisions of the Hague Convention39 would protect the
defendant who reverse engineered a piece of software from civil liti-
gation, or subsequent enforcement of a judgment, it could do nothing
to save that party from criminal prosecution in a country with differ-
ent public policy concerns that enacted laws criminally forbidding re-
verse engineering.
37. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist
and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, opened for signature Nov. 23,
2001, E.T.S. No. 185.
38. See Mikael Pawlo, Bloody Hard to Run a Forum in Sweden-Lawyer Speaks,
REGISTER, Mar. 28, 2002, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/24632.html. Mikael Pawlo is
an associate at Advokatfirman Lindahl, working with Internet law issues for Aftonbladet Nya
Medier.
In a recent ruling by the district court of Stockholm, the publisher of the Swedish
daily Aftonbladet was found guilty of hate speech and sentenced to a conditional
sentence and fines. An anonymous user in a moderated forum on the Aftonbladet
web site uttered the hate speech.
It has been debated whether the speech was removed from the forum quickly
enough or not, but that is an issue not dealt with in this case. According to the court
the crime was committed immediately upon publication....
Id.
39. See infra Subsections IV.A.2 and IV.C.3.c (discussing the effect of public policy
exceptions to enforcement of judgments on the values of uniformity of law and pluralism).
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While possibly an extreme example, the Elcomsoft case is in-
structive.40 There a Russian programmer was criminally prosecuted
when he came to the US for a conference.41 Had there been an inter-
national convention on jurisdiction and enforcement (whether that of
the Hague Convention draft or that of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg pro-
posal), it would not have made one whit of difference.
E. The Civil-Criminal Interface Is Blurring
As copyright and freedom of speech give rise to new crimes,
something else is happening, too. Just as assault can be both criminal
and civil, many statutorily conferred rights permit both criminal ac-
tions by the government and civil actions by those injured. To make
it even more complex, in certain countries, such as France, associa-
tions that meet certain criteria can gain standing to bring criminal ac-
tions, notably in discrimination suits,42 but also against those breaking
French language laws.43 The use of the populace as a private police
force heightens concerns about efforts to criminalize speech and
copyright-related acts.44 If such actions are within the scope of a fu-
ture draft of the Hague Convention, it will have to address a host of
thorny new issues. If such actions are outside the scope of the Con-
vention, then a range of new criminal actions between private parties
will be much like civil suits, but without the Convention's terms hav-
ing any effect on them.
F Actors Outside the Reach of the Convention
In any international convention, there is always a fear that non-
member jurisdictions will somehow thwart the goals of the members
in agreeing to the convention. The threat of nonsignatories is directly
related to their power in other areas. For example, for a long time
40. United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
41. United States v. Dmitry Sklyarov, Criminal No. 5-01-257P (N.D. Cal. filed 2001)
(charging defendant for violating Title 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US-vSklyarov/20010707-complaint.html. Jennifer Lee, In
Digital Copyright Case, Programmer Can Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at C4, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/14/technology/14HACK.html.
42. See C. PtN. art. R. 645-2 (French penal code).
43. In certain cases, the victim's consent is not even needed to bring such a case.
Interestingly, class action cases do not exist in this context in France, so such cases must be
brought on individual bases.
44. The absence of class actions in France, along with the difficulty of gaining attorney's
fees, makes such actions less enticing for groups that are economically motivated or not well
capitalized.
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US publishers were able to take advantage of the Berne Convention
without the US becoming a party to it.45 But for a treaty addressing
web-related activities, "power" may not mean what it has meant in
other contexts. Giving power its usual sense, powerful signatories
who wanted the Hague Convention to matter could further that goal
by responding to nonsignatories in ways that made them join. Re-
gardless of the power of the nonsignatory (whether a small country
the size of Rhode Island or the US itself), economic pressure could be
brought to bear to change national law that was inconsistent with the
Hague Convention's principles. If the nonsignatory were a large
player in world trade, the signatories might grant it concessions to
bring it on board or to enhance the value of membership in some
way. For example, if the Convention were to include a clause that
litigation involving nationals of signatories were treated with "special
dispatch" or provided for an efficient transnational appeal process,
citizens of the nonsignatory might more strongly urge it to ratify the
agreement.
But nonsignatories who did not want to join, and who did not
have appreciable power in world trade except as nonsignatories,
might be able to circumvent the Convention's goals, regardless of its
powerful supporters. Such a prospect could actually encourage some
countries to refuse membership in the Convention. Of course, as in
so many situations in the international arena, they would only benefit
if many other countries did join a convention. The situation would
have a prisoner's dilemma quality: if the national advantage from not
joining the Convention were such that others are encouraged not to
join, the Convention would collapse. There would be a kind of
Gresham's Law effect. Gresham's Law stands for the proposition
that bad money drives out good. Here, vocal nonjoiners would drive
out tentative joiners.
This appears to be the fear among the content owners-the
music recording industry, the movie industry, and other entertain-
45. See S. Rep. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 577-78 (1988).
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ment publishing industries. They are concerned that "data havens"46
will facilitate the widespread duplication and distribution of copy-
righted content by a combination of lax or nonexistent enforcement
of copyright laws, or no copyright laws, and a refusal to enforce for-
eign judgments based on foreign copyright laws. 47 Other types of ha-
vens besides data havens are possible, and even likely. One could
easily imagine a nonsignatory jurisdiction with laws modeled on the
US First Amendment that would be considered a speech haven by
European jurisdictions. A privacy haven might also exist, raising sub-
stantial legitimate challenges to the Hague Convention's goals.
Members of the Convention (when there is one and it has mem-
bers) will be able to use coordinated electronic blockades to fence out
nonsignatory havens if the standard weapons of political pressure,
trade sanctions, or even physical blockades, do not work. Those
weapons might also be used on jurisdictions that are friendly to the
havens-providing them with physical necessities such as computers
or telecommunications equipment. If the havens are not completely
self-sufficient, measures against their trading partners might work. If
they do not, the Hague Convention will be far less useful with respect
to activities sheltered by the havens.
G. International Alternatives of the Future (Nonconventional)
The future may see other developments that eviscerate the im-
portance of an international convention on jurisdiction and enforce-
ment. One possibility is the creation of a non-nationally-based court
system to deal with disputes between parties without an identifiable
46. For example, there is a new company called HavenCo. See generally www.havenco.
com (last visited July 12, 2002). Its story is as follows:
HavenCo has been providing services since May 2000 and is fully operational,
offering the world's most secure managed servers in the world's only true free market
environment, the Principality of Sealand. Our testing period is now over, and we can
offer services to all businesses which comply with our Acceptable Use Policy. Setup
takes approximately 3-5 days, and dedicated servers in managed colocation, with
ample bandwidth, are competitively priced with other secure centers around the
world....
The Principality of Sealand is a former World War II anti-aircraft military fortress
in the North Sea. Only authorized persons directly involved in the HavenCo project
are permitted to land on the island. The Sealand Government is ideal for web
business, as there are no direct reporting or registration requirements.
Id.
47. Data havens that are members of the Convention could at least invoke Article 28(f) of
the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, supra note 3, stating a public
policy in favor of the most expansive language permitted by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994.
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domicile, or concerning disputes about subject matter that lacks a
connection to any geographic location.
Such a system might be attractive to companies that are the
product of international mergers. These companies may be more
nonnational than bi- or tri-national. For example, a company like
DaimlerChrysler may become with the passage of time neither
American nor German in its culture and expectations; a company like
Reed-Elsevier may be neither as Dutch nor as British as its compo-
nent parts were. Such organizations may want to have a court system
that employs what they see as the best from everywhere. They could
agree among themselves to create such courts for the purpose of re-
solving disputes between themselves. Organizations with a constitu-
ent entity from a common law country might prefer a system based
on court-created precedent. ADR would not serve that purpose very
well because, among other things, its decisions are often not rendered
in the format of a reasoned judicial opinion and are frequently kept
confidential. ICANN, although much maligned in its present incarna-
tion,48 may be a harbinger of such institutionalized nonnational dis-
pute resolution systems. They may build on the substance that the
Hague drafters have struggled with, but at the same time they may
render the Hague itself less important.
H. Does It Matter or Not?
Lawyers so often like the belt-and-suspenders approach. It may
be wisest to continue to try to perfect the Hague Convention, and to
employ as much creativity and intelligence as possible to make it
meet the goals it should, even while knowing that the forces enumer-
ated in this Part (as well, no doubt, as in other works) could render it
less important, at least as it applies to copyright. Also, as noted
above, the creators or enforcers of the alternatives to the Hague
Convention may look to it for guidance (or to drafts, if there never is
an "it"). The next Parts of this Article, therefore, address, first, the
values the Hague should embody, and second, some of the specific
terms of the draft and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal.
48. Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 257 (2002); Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 141 (2001); ICANN Symposium in 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2002).
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III. IF THE HAGUE CONVENTION DOES MATIER, WHAT VALUES
SHOULD INFORM IT?
On the assumption that a new Hague Convention could matter,
if not of itself then as a useful guide for other alternatives,9 the values
that ought to be fostered by the Convention should be identified.
This exercise may clarify which proposed provisions in existing drafts
and proposals are better than others. It can also illuminate the sorts
of provisions that have the greatest potential to solidify and expand
support for any convention.
The values, in our view, are uniformity, predictability, pluralism
and openness. Briefly, we define these terms as follows:
Uniformity: treating similarly situated parties similarly. In con-
nection with enforcement of foreign judgments, it is similar to com-
ity5O and reciprocity5l but not exactly identical with either. It is both
more global and less bilateral than reciprocity, and more legal and
less equitable than comity. The concept of uniformity offers courts
the flexibility to treat similarly situated parties similarly, while per-
mitting parties to urge that in a particular situation the dissimilarities
are stronger and different treatment is appropriate.
Predictability: providing some degree of certainty (defining the
realm of possibilities, though not the specifics of them, nor the odds)
so that people contemplating an activity or observing an undesired
event will have some idea of what the outcome will be if the there is a
lawsuit and a subsequent enforcement action. For example, predict-
ability is enhanced by a largely uniform set of procedural rules.
Pluralism: respecting the differences in the legal systems of dif-
ferent countries, procedural as well as substantive, statutory as well as
regulatory, custom, and the absence of statutes. This value has two
benefits, a practical one and a philosophical one. The practical one is
that by valuing pluralism, the Convention may be less objectionable
to a wider range of countries, and will therefore be more likely to be
49. Although many of the issues raised in this Section might minimize or negate the
applicability of the Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal to digital
information goods, it still is an important area for the control of analog information goods and
other torts and contracts not as easily controlled through nonnegotiated contracts, mandatory
arbitration, and criminal law as the digital goods discussed throughout this Article.
50. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 178
(2d ed. 1990). It is more than comity, because comity implies that the enforcing court is acting
completely voluntarily.
• 51. It is not solely the reciprocity of a bilateral agreement's "I only enforce your judgments
if you enforce mine."
1235
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widely ratified. The philosophical one is similar to that of "federal-
ism" and "the states as laboratories" in the US. Over time, a solution
favored in one country or group of countries may prove to be less
beneficial than a solution favored elsewhere. If total uniformity is
imposed, it will be impossible to "run the experiment" to make such a
determination.
Openness: maintaining open electronic borders as well as being
"open for business" as much as possible. In the bricks and mortar
world, this is analogous to (1) removing barriers to trade between
countries, and (2) having long hours and multiple locations. With re-
gard to the first, the electronic world has more ways than customs,
duties and taxation to close borders, even though its transaction costs
may be a small fraction of their counterparts in the physical world.
With regard to the second, the electronic world already provides
"24/7" access but can close the door in ways that require no human
intervention. Explicitly valuing openness may prevent efforts to cre-
ate, in the electronic world, unnecessary parallels to the physical
world. 52
These four values differ in the ways they would affect the draft-
ing of an international convention on jurisdiction and enforcement.
The values of uniformity and predictability can be embodied in the
language of specific provisions. That is, those values revolve around
litigation-actual or potential. The value of pluralism may lead to
specific language, but may lead also to omissions in the Convention.
Pluralism has a broader compass than uniformity or predictability and
it is less tied to litigation.
The value of openness is the broadest: it relates to the world
environment in which the actors do whatever they are doing (and
most of the time that is not litigation). It is a value that can affect
how and what the drafters choose to draft, but it mostly does that
negatively, by identifying how certain language or provisions might
foster the closing, rather than the opening, of electronic borders and
doors. The value of openness may therefore suggest the deletion or
redrafting of provisions that are facially conducive to uniformity, pre-
dictability and pluralism. Openness may be the hardest value to main-
tain in a convention drafted with a focus on decreasing the risks of the
52. For example, consider a system of electronic stamping: software that inserts in an
electronic message the zip code and country of origin of the sender, and permits recipients to
see the stamp when the message arrives. If a country recognized a cause of action making
senders whose messages lack stamps liable to recipients, then providing jurisdiction and
enforcement against foreign senders would adversely affect open E-commerce.
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inherently risky process of litigation. Even though most actors only
rarely resort to litigation to resolve disputes, the choices made to
harmonize the rules for jurisdiction and enforcement could chill or
freeze entire avenues of electronic activity.
We next explore these four values more fully, to illuminate some
of the problems the drafters of an optimal convention will face.
A. Uniformity
For an international convention to be successful, it must be per-
ceived as fair to all parties. To achieve that goal, burdens and bene-
fits should be allocated fairly. If a US citizen successfully sues a
French citizen in France on a cause of action that is recognized in
both the US and French legal systems, and then seeks to enforce the
judgment in the US, the rules about whether to accept the original
basis of jurisdiction and whether to enforce the judgment should be
the same as they would be if the nationalities of the courts and parties
were reversed. We call this uniformity. It combines the notions of
comity and reciprocity, concepts that have long informed the law of
international enforcement of judgments. "Reciprocity" suggests a
relationship between two parties, rather than a communal relation-
ship, and "comity" is a more voluntary relationship that does not as
directly address rules setting out bases for jurisdiction. "Uniformity"
is meant to be more flexible than either of the other terms.
The desire for uniformity is central to the initial discussions sur-
rounding the Hague Convention draft. Current law regarding the en-
forcement of foreign judgments is asymmetric. The US has a long
tradition of enforcing foreign judgments on the basis of international
comity.53 At the start of the Hague Convention negotiations, the US
was seeking more uniform enforcement of US judgments abroad.54
Other jurisdictions were generally refusing to enforce US judgments
because US courts took jurisdiction on too slim a basis55 or because
the US remedy was not something the enforcing court could have
53. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see generally Ronald A. Brand,
Enforcement of Judgments in the United States and Europe, 13 J.L. & COM. 193 (1994); Linda J.
Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALl: Herein of Foreign
Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000).
54. Brand, supra note 53.
55. When civil law courts choose not to enforce US judgments, it is often because they
reject the US basis of initial jurisdiction, such as "doing business" and "tag jurisdiction." See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(a) (1986) (rejecting tag
jurisdiction).
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awarded had it heard the original suit. To achieve greater uniformity
in enforcement, signatories have to agree upon the bases of jurisdic-
tion first.56 This is in part why a convention on enforcement must, as
a necessary precondition, solve the jurisdiction issue by creating some
uniformity.57
1. Uniformity and "Nationality Shopping"
Asymmetric enforcement of foreign judgments has the potential
to harm the economies of enforcing countries and enhance those of
nonenforcing ones. This is true whether the judgments are for money
damages or for injunctions. If companies perceive that there is a real
risk that their assets could be seized to satisfy foreign judgments, they
may choose to relocate their assets to nonenforcing countries. If they
perceive that there is a real risk that they could be shut down in their
home country by the enforcement of a foreign injunction, they may
choose to operate in a nonenforcing country. The presence of
uniformity in a well-subscribed international legal system would re-
duce the incentive for nationality shopping.
Businesses that might be affected include both those that are
considered legitimate (for example, manufacturers of generally safe
but sometimes dangerous products, such as firecrackers or makers of
new drugs or therapeutic devices) as well as those that are less legiti-
mate (for example, sellers of snake oil or video pirates). Both types
of businesses might try to find a country whose domestic laws would
prevent them from being sued at all-perhaps because their laws pre-
vent foreigners from suing nationals at all, or because they do not
have a cause of action for product liability or copyright infringement.
If the country also refused to be a member of an international con-
vention, it would probably not enforce judgments of foreign courts
against one of its nationals. Such a country would become the na-
tionality of choice -as well as a desirable place to squirrel assets.5 8
Large multinational corporations with assets in numerous foreign
jurisdictions may not see a need to alter their behavior, but smaller
56. Kathryn A. Russell, Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The
Brussels System as an Impetus for United States Action, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 57, 72
(1993).
57. Although absolute uniformity would require concrete lists of mandatory and
impermissible grounds for jurisdiction, a gray list of permissible bases for jurisdiction could also
be used: all signatories would have to agree to enforce judgments where the jurisdiction had
been predicated on a basis from the list of permissibles, unless there was a separate reason
supporting refusal.
58. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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companies might. Without a convention, there could be an exodus of
assets, businesses or both, from the enforcing countries-such as the
US-to the nonenforcing countries. If a convention were adopted by
many but not all countries, there might still be an exodus to non-
member states. 59
2. Uniformity at Risk? The Public Policy Exception to Enforcement
Other actions and inactions of both members and nonmembers
might also thwart global uniformity. Nonmembers might refuse to
take jurisdiction over any cases with foreign parties (whether initial
actions or enforcement actions). Nonmembers are also, perhaps,
more likely to have laws, customs or policies embodying distinctive
norms that would lead their courts to refuse enforcement of foreign
judgments even when their national laws permitted some measure of
enforcement.60 Nevertheless, assuming Gresham's law does not apply
and a critical mass of signatories is achieved, countries who have not
joined and whose policies are harming uniformity can be dealt with in
other ways. 61
Member countries, too, could reduce the level of uniformity in
the global legal system. They might find a loophole on which to base
wholesale refusal to enforce certain types of judgments or judgments
issued by a particular jurisdiction. Assuming the convention included
agreed-upon bases of jurisdiction, the most likely such loophole
would be a public policy exception. Such an exception would further
the goal of pluralism62 but, if overused, could undercut uniformity.63
A convention that sought absolute uniformity would lack such an ex-
ception, but would totally sacrifice pluralism. Substantial uniformity
is therefore preferable to absolute uniformity.
Absolute uniformity of enforcement of foreign judgments is un-
desirable because national public policies will sometimes trump the
policy favoring uniformity. Indeed, public policy is a well-settled ex-
ception to foreign enforcement.64 This is almost axiomatic, since en-
59. See supra Section II.E.
60. See infra Section III.C.
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Section III.C.
63. See supra Section III.A.
64. Robert J. Sharpe, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in DEBTOR-CREDITOR
LAW: PRACTICE AND DOCTRINE 684-85 (M.A. Springman & Eric Gertner eds., 1985). In the
United States context, see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) ("No action can
be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is
contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.").
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forcement of a foreign judgment is (at least in the common law view
of legal matters) an equitable issue.65 A court sitting in equity must
do justice and must consider matters affecting the community, not
just the parties.
The public policy exception has been widely recognized in other
statutes and conventions concerning a wide array of topics. In the
context of money judgments, for example, a substantial majority of
US states66 have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment
Recognition Act.67 Those states agree to enforce foreign money
judgments that are "final," "conclusive" and "enforceable where ren-
dered,"68 but there are stated conditions by which the state's courts
may refuse to recognize the judgment. One of those reasons is that
"the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based
is repugnant to the public policy of [the] state." 69
In the world of the web, there have already been instances of na-
tional laws that, to foreign eyes, are surprising. Many involve crimi-
nal, rather than civil, liabilityO and so would not have been affected
by the Hague Convention had it already been ratified. Still, these
criminal prosecutions shed light on situations where the public policy
exception might be invoked to prevent enforcement of a foreign
judgment. In one well-publicized case, Yahoo encountered trouble
with a French criminal statute71 that prohibits the sale of Nazi ob-
jects.72 Yahoo was forced to either police its auction website or make
the Nazi artifact part of the site off limits to French citizens. In an-
other case, criminal prosecution under the US's new Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act73 was used to stop foreign activities on the web.74
65. "Comity-the respect that sovereign nations ... owe each other-is a traditional,
although in the nature of things a rather vague, consideration in the exercise of equitable
discretion." Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993).
66. See Uniform Law Comm'rs, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts: A Few Facts
About the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/
nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp (last visited July 17, 2002). UFMJRA
has been adopted in thirty states and the District of Columbia.
67. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT OF 1962, 13 U.L.A. 80
(Supp. 1998) [hereinafter UFMJRA].
68. Id. § 2.
69. Id. § 4(b)(3). The bracketed language in this section includes two alternatives with one
to be selected later in the drafting process.
70. See supra Sections II.D, E.
71. See supra Section II.E.
72. LICRA et UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo Fr., T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/Jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm. But see YAHOO!, Inc. v. LICRA,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
73. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (at 17
U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1322 (West Supp. 2000) and 24 U.S.C. § 4001).
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An example of a civil action that falls into this category is Germany's
long-standing but recently repealed ban on comparative advertising,75
which also had the potential to affect global E-commerce.
But these are the exceptions. For many situations, the substan-
tive law applicable to the behavior or events that form the basis for
the cause of action is essentially universal. Examples include car ac-
cidents, breach of contract claims, or civil assault claims. These will
most often be essentially the same in both the original forum country
and the enforcing country. If substantially uniform grounds for juris-
diction and enforcement can be agreed upon, the Convention has the
potential to gain momentum in its search for supporters and signato-
ries.
B. Predictability
Predictability is necessary because an international agreement
that does not permit parties to predict the likely effect of their legal
and business actions will deter all but a few actors from the very kinds
of activity-things having to do with the Internet-that are assumed
here to be socially desirable and conducive to the good of everyone
everywhere. (The undeterred few may include the most risk loving,
the most compulsive, those with nothing to lose and those with no
other choice.) The Convention must be as predictable as possible to
gain the confidence of, and win support from, the maximum number
of potential litigants, legislators, judges, lobbyists, trade representa-
tives, governments, etc. First, the Convention should ensure that
people are able to make informed decisions about whether or not to
pursue various courses of action. Second, the Convention should en-
sure that people feel comfortable that they will always be able to
make such decisions intelligently (if they ever need to) because the
surprises are kept to an acceptable level.
To reach a predictable result there should be both substantive
and procedural standards known to all parties at the outset. If the as-
sertion of jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments is what will
happen "all other things being equal," then substantive predictability
will flow from explicit statements in the Convention identifying the
exceptions. The current proposals for such exceptions are discussed
74. See supra note 40 concerning Elcom distributing E-book related software in the US.
75. See Case C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV v. Yves Rocher
GmbH, 1993 E.C.R. 1-2361 (discussing the overbroad nature of German advertising laws in
banning comparative advertising that is not misleading).
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in the Section IV, below.76 Procedural predictability will flow from
explicit international standards for procedural exceptions, such as due
process or lack of judicial bias.
Procedural predictability in enforcement depends in part on sub-
stantive predictability in jurisdiction. Website owners want to be able
to predict whether the actions of their sites will subject them to the
jurisdiction of a particular country. 77 If, under the harmonized rules,
their websites' mere existence cannot alone be the basis for jurisdic-
tion in every country with a modem, and if their assets are all located
in their home country, then they will have no reason to fear foreign
enforcement of judgments. After all, what is the possibility of a court
improperly taking jurisdiction, then issuing a judgment, and then, in
an action for enforcement in another country where they do have as-
sets, the second court ignoring their objections that the first court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the judgment?
If, however, the jurisdiction rules are unpredictable, the website
owner may rightly fear enforcement at home of an improper judg-
ment entered by a foreign court. Potential defendants who want to
stay in business will then have no choice but to try to keep abreast of
the frequently changing rules of jurisdiction over websites throughout
the world. None but the biggest multinational corporations are likely
to be able to do this. Smaller innovators who cannot allay the fears of
stockholders or potential investors might be frozen out. A conven-
tion with greater predictability would decrease risk and uncertainty,
thereby encouraging investment in E-commerce in general and mul-
tinational E-commerce initiatives in particular.
C. Pluralism
A unified international legal system with trans- or nonnational
courts and a single set of substantive and procedural laws and rules
would have a high degree of uniformity and predictability. Everyone
would know what to expect because all the world's legal disputes
would be tested by the same rule set. Borders would lose their im-
portance and national character would become irrelevant. But there
76. See infra notes 167-70.
77. The scope of the Hague Convention is extremely broad, dealing with both jurisdiction
and enforcement of judgments. If the Convention needs to be scaled back, a Convention
limited to establishing uniform and predictable rules for jurisdiction and choice of laws in the
electronic environment could be a worthwhile enterprise.
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is little demand in the world as yet for a totally homogenized legal
culture.
The value of pluralism permits individual nations to determine
what is most important to them so that they can preserve what they
hold most dear and harmonize away the rest. Pluralism is, therefore,
a value that an international convention should honor. This is neces-
sary, of course, to gain supporters: nations are not willing yet to sur-
render their sovereignty completely on the issues of jurisdiction or
enforcement, nor to allow other countries' substantive law to be le-
gitimized when it is contrary to the home country's law. But plural-
ism is also important on a philosophical level, regardless of its
expediency.
1. The Nation-State As a Necessary Laboratory
The US's system of federalism values state sovereignty, states'
rights and the ability of the states to try different solutions for legal
and policy matters rather than imposing a uniform solution across the
country. Most Americans, especially Americans who have completed
a law degree, find the arguments in favor of such pluralism quite
compelling, and the authors of this Article are no different. The
metaphor most often associated with this outlook is that the states are
"laboratories." Society can run "experiments" in social policy by
having the laws be different in Michigan from what they are in New
York or Louisiana.78
Nations are laboratories to an even greater degree because their
legal systems differ from one another: civil v. common law, for exam-
ple. In addition, their substantive laws vary, even in the relatively
harmonized area of copyright. Examples from the specific to the
general are easy to identify. At one end of that continuum is legisla-
tion (or lack thereof) concerning colorization of movies. The French
had a very different view of the benefits of this technology than did
the Americans.7 9 Whether to protect database compilers as copyright
owners is an example of a policy with greater breadth. The Europe-
78. The phrase "governmental laboratories" has long been applied to states. See New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It has also been
applied to Indian tribes. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 757 (1989).
79. See generally Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1
(1994).
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ans saw this as a good thing, the US has not agreed.80 At the most
general level, whether to have protection for copyright at all may be a
national choice.81 Pluralism provides information on which to make
the debate of scholars and historians less speculative and more based
on reality.82
In a world with a single legal system, there would be no opportu-
nity to see how these differences play out for the citizens of the coun-
tries involved, or for the world. Governments as laboratories may
provide more anecdotal evidence than empirical data, but that does
not necessarily diminish the influence of the experiments. If the
world had a single global legal culture, far more would be lost than
gained. As new ideas, technologies and historical events challenge
laws developed in earlier times, a variety of approaches may need to
be tried before the optimal solution is found.
2. Law As Culture Bearer
A legal system embodies and perpetuates the values of the soci-
ety in which it was created and in which it evolves. A culture that
places a high value on individual property rights would have a fairly
broad intellectual property regime and would generally honor free-
dom of contract. A culture that validates a high expectation of indi-
vidual privacy would make different compromises with property
rights than one that viewed privacy as less important. Some cultural
values receive legislative support; others find their protectors in ac-
tions of the executive or decisions in the court system. Whether or
not those with lobbying power dominate the legislative process, the
legal system reflects the culture both in the process of making laws
and in their substance.
The ability to survey the world's legal systems and compare
other countries to one's own can, for the cultural majority, reinforce
the legitimacy of the choices made. Cultural minorities, meanwhile,
may find fuel for persuasive arguments for changing the status quo in
the existence and success of laws they agree with in other jurisdic-
tions.83 Additionally, cross-cultural understanding may improve
80. See supra note 13.
81. See supra note 46 (discussing "HavenCo").
82. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE (1984); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
477-78 (1996).
83. In extreme cases, individuals can "nation shop" by moving where the legal system is
more parallel to their own personal values, in effect voting with their feet.
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through a greater understanding of why different nations have made
different legal choices. Explicitly placing a high value on legal plu-
ralism has direct benefits for individuals and nations as well as for the
world as a whole.
D. Openness
A convention that addresses jurisdiction and enforcement is ob-
viously about litigation. The values of uniformity and predictability
also focus on litigation, on what individuals, businesses, and countries
want and expect from, and are willing to provide in, their judicial sys-
tems. The goal is to reduce litigation both by facilitating resolution of
disputes prior to suit as well as encouraging settlement of existing
suits.
The value of pluralism transcends litigation and acts as a check
on an over-commitment to uniformity and predictability. The last
value, openness (the free flow of goods, services, and information
over the web, without borders constructed by public or private ac-
tors), checks the cross-border effect of pluralism, so that the laws of a
single jurisdiction do not spread automatically beyond its borders.
Openness is a value that countries interested in having interna-
tional agreements are likely to see as important to their nationals,
too. A uniform, predictable system that is respectful of pluralism (one
that routinely enforces foreign judgments) could encourage anti-
openness behavior that might lessen such countries' support for the
convention. For example, plaintiffs would choose to sue defendants
in jurisdictions with the most pro-plaintiff laws. To counter that, po-
tential defendants would avoid being accessible in distant jurisdic-
tions for fear of such laws. The net effect would be that by
encouraging pluralism, actors who saw themselves as potential liti-
gants could begin to re-create national borders in the electronic envi-
ronment. Such borders might well be unnecessary and due less to a
real threat than to an aversion to imagined risk, but would still harm
openness.
In an international convention on jurisdiction and enforcement,
openness may be easier to address by its absence, or by reducing
threats to its existence, than by its presence. Generally speaking,
openness is lost when transaction costs become so high-or are feared
to be so high-that the web-related activities are discouraged. We
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will use the word "fences" to refer to barriers that close electronic
borders.84
To understand how a convention can deter fencing and foster
openness we will next consider various kinds of fences, and who will
build them. The most obvious examples are private E-commerce
companies building fences by blocking access to their website, using a
filter that screens out users such as those who are not paying mem-
bers, those with undesired Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses, or
those from a particular jurisdiction.85 Sovereigns, too, may build
fences by enacting laws or setting policies that prevent citizens from
accessing certain sites or types of information. Sovereigns may act in
response to lobbying by powerful E-commerce actors with a presence
in the sovereign's territory, but their fence building may also reflect
the culture or philosophy of the nation or a powerful segment of its
society. Drafters of a good Convention need to anticipate fence
building and create an environment where it is kept to a minimum.86
Fencing may be an appropriate method to avoid civil causes of action
under laws that are known and foreign (in the sense of unfamiliar and
dissimilar from the actor's own legal system), but overfencing due to
less rational fears about civil litigation in the abstract and its risks can
be discouraged. Fencing has many applications outside of the Hague
84. There are substantial social costs to fences. For example, an individual blocked from a
medical information website might become sicker, an individual blocked from a museum site
might not be inspired to create new works that would enrich society, and a company wanting to
purchase a widget might not be able to find it. Because of copyright as well as human variety
and interest, much on the web may only be available from a single source. This makes limiting
access (on a pay-per-view basis, for example) easier to accomplish. This loss of info-diversity on
the web could quickly become substantial. Fencing also diminishes some of the benefits of the
medium, particularly those that improve understanding between different cultures and nations.
The "State of the Internet Report," produced jointly by the US Internet Council and
International Technology & Trade Associates Inc. (ITTA), found that new users-mainly from
the South Pacific region-helped shrink the share of native English speakers online to roughly
45 percent of the estimated total of 500 million Web users. US INTERNET COUNCIL AND INT'L
TECH. & TRADE ASSOCS., INC., STATE OF THE INTERNET (3d ed. 2001), available at
http://www.itta.com/intemet200l.exsum.htm.
85. Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1676 (1998). These active measures are in contrast to monitoring or
tracking, in which movement is tracked, but not blocked. The IP address identifies the specific
computer connected to the Internet and locates it relative to other computers on the Internet,
much the way a street number, street name, city name, state, and country identifies the location
of a house in the physical world.
86. There will always be tension between openness and pluralism but philosophical, as well
as practical, coexistence is worth striving for.
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Convention, as well, such as to avoid known criminal liability in a for-
eign jurisdiction.87
Openness and overfencing are incompatible, but openness com-
bined with uniformity, predictability and pluralism means that the ju-
risdictional and enforcement rules should not encourage under-
fencing. Openness respects fencing done in good faith and with a
reasonable expectation of effectiveness.88 Before understanding how
to strike this balance, one must understand the various types of
fencing and their underlying rationales.
1. Private Fences in E-Commerce: Gatekeepers, Cashiers,
Bouncers, Language Barriers, and Warning Signs
a. Why: Fear of Foreign Litigation
Website owners without fenced sites potentially subject them-
selves to jurisdiction in hundreds of nations simultaneously. They
might be sued for libel in Britain, sending spain in Denmark,89 sale of
copyright-protected goods in the US, etc. Whether the website owner
does not understand the other countries' substantive laws or jurisdic-
tional rules, does not want to have to bother understanding them,
does know about them or finds them dangerous or costly, prudent
owners may decide that the best course is to fence out any jurisdiction
where the costs of litigation are likely to outweigh the benefits of op-
erating in that jurisdiction.
b. Where: Fencing at the Door or the Cash Register?
The location of these different kinds of fences may be at the elec-
tronic equivalent of the door or that of the cash register. The fence at
the door prevents would-be customers from entering at all; the fence
at the cash register prevents them from completing the purchase.
Sites that fence at the door can make themselves inaccessible to indi-
87. Criminal liability, as discussed in Part II, supra, is not something a Hague Convention is
designed to address, but increasing criminalization of traditionally civil actions is another area
of tension between openness and pluralism.
88. Applying the goal of openness to the draft Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg proposal is discussed infra Part IV.
89. The Danish Marketing Practices Act, Consolidated Act No. 699, July, 17 2000,
available at http://www.fs.dk/uk/acts/ukmfl.htm (banning unsolicited E-mail); see generally
http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/countries/c-dk.html#MPA (last visited July 30, 2002) (discussing
the Danish Marketing Practices Act, stating that E-mail in Denmark "has been placed on the
same footing as fax and automated calling systems. A sender of advertising material via these
media must have the prior consent of the recipient.").
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viduals or groups. Sites that fence at the cash register can permit ac-
cess to the site, but then refuse to trade when they find out where the
would-be customer is from or who the customer is.
It is not all that hard for webmasters to make sure their websites
are not accessible from particular jurisdictions.90 They can do it
themselves, or they can purchase software that enables the webpage's
server to trace an accessing party's location and to exclude those us-
ers who appear to come from particular jurisdictions.91 Website own-
ers could fence by jurisdiction at the cash register by asking for the
user's country, viewing the shipping address, the zip code, or the E-
mail address to which product shipping information is to be sent. If it
were a forbidden country, the customer would be told that the trans-
action could not be completed. Although none of these methods are
foolproof and all are subject to fraud, they are all likely to be consid-
ered good faith fencing efforts.
c. Who: Fencing Out Individuals or Whole Jurisdictions
This fence could apply to all visitors from outside the website's
domicile, nationals of a specific foreign jurisdiction, or specific indi-
viduals or groups of individuals (for example, a blacklist of those
known to be particularly litigious). Individuals can be blocked at the
door by IP address, but this would not prevent the same individual
using another computer or an anonymizer.92 A credit card number,
shipping address, or another account number could be used to block
an individual at the cash register.
d. How: Picket Fences and Concrete Walls
Webmasters can use different types of fences, low-level protec-
tion for general fear of liability and high-level protection for immi-
nent threat of suit. These fences can be used at either the door or the
cash register and with entire jurisdictions or with individuals.
One easy form of low-level protection for website owners is to
use a language that is unique to a particular country. For example, a
90. See generally, Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Towards Greater Certainty for
Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001).
91. This is generally achieved through IP lookups that use the unique IP address to
determine the user's location. Several companies, such as Quova (www.quova.com) and
Akamai (www.akamai.com) offer such services.
92. An anonymizer is a service that permits someone using the web to not be linked to a
particular IP address or individual by routing the uploads and downloads through an
intermediary site.
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Swedish company whose site is only in Swedish would not be likely to
be sued in Turkey, even though the site was accessible in Turkey.93
Such fencing-by-language-barrier, however, could be rendered inef-
fective if universal translation software becomes better and omni-
present.
Other examples of low-level protection include the following:
placing printed warnings on the site but not otherwise enforcing what
the warning says, requiring users to confess their location or affilia-
tion but not checking their veracity, screening users on the basis of
the country code in their E-mail address, or limiting transactions to a
particular currency. While persistent users could undoubtedly glide
through the gaps in these picket fences, the fences might be enough to
save the website owner from subjecting itself to jurisdiction in, or en-
forcement of judgments from, the courts of the fenced-out country. 94
Higher-security fences would provide more protection from
feared jurisdiction or enforcement. They would also, however, re-
quire more effort or sophisticated software. For example, a website
might require verifiable information, such as a passport number or
export license, and would check it prior to physical or electronic
shipment. It could also require some type of electronic certificate
representing one's country of origin or a digital document that had
been notarized.
Private fencing is an important tool in E-commerce that acts as a
buffer when openness and pluralism collide. By better understanding
why sites fence, the Convention can better discourage under- and
overfencing.
2. Public Fences
Sovereigns have fencing mechanisms not available to private en-
tities. Often their fences will take the form of criminal legislation.
Although that is outside the scope of the Hague Convention, such
fencing is nevertheless important because it might stimulate private
fencing.
93. The same could probably not be said if the site was in English rather than Swedish.
English is so widely understood that its use could be construed as an attempt to solicit business
on a global scope.
94. See infra Subsection IV.A.l.b; see also infra note 154 and accompanying text. Instead
of relying on overfencing to prevent foreign courts from asserting jurisdiction over a website,
see Subsection IV.A.l.c for a proposal that achieves the same goal while eliminating the
incentive to overfence.
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Sovereigns also have reasons to fence that do not motivate pri-
vate parties. Governments might fence to protect the national econ-
omy: they might block electronic competition in order to protect
domestic industries, just as they erect trade barriers to build up
nonelectronic businesses. Governments also might want to protect
their citizens from social harm, blocking websites on political, relig-
ious, or any other grounds.95 Domestically operated sites may be
subject to criminal prosecution, but foreign sites may not be, de-
pending on the nation's jurisdictional statutes. So governments may
seek to block undesirable sites (or all foreign sites) by having all In-
ternet traffic come through a single state-controlled proxy server or
otherwise control the only Internet access to sites outside the coun-
try.96
3. Blocking the Street: ISPs and Liability
When ISPs act as (passive) conduits rather than as (active) web-
site owners, they convey vast amounts of Internet traffic of all sorts.97
In the US, people accept that ISPs do not know, and should not
know, what is traveling through their network, and should not be li-
able for the information conveyed over their networks.98 In part, this
reflects a concern for-and a valuing of-privacy rights.99 The long-
standing belief of Americans-dating back at least to Ben Franklin,
inventor of the penny post-is that mail is confidential. Citizens
should not read someone else's mail, and certainly the government
must not, unless it gets a warrant. 00 ISPs are mail carriers, and even
downloading documents from the web, while not personal E-mail, has
95. Dissident Web Site Blocked in Cuba, Activists Say, Reuters, Dec. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.cubainfolinks.net/Articles/blocked.htm; Jennifer Lee, Punching Holes in Internet
Walls, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2001, at G1; Freedom Forum, In China, Access Denied-Again,
Oct. 23, 2001, at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=15214.
96. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
97. Internet traffic continues to double every ten to fourteen months. Jason Krause, Has
the Net Stopped Growing?, INDUSTRY STANDARD, June 26, 2001. In 2001, Time Magazine
reported that every forty-five minutes, AT&T transmitted a quantity of data-meaning
everything from E-mail to streaming video-equal to thirty-four times the contents of the
Library of Congress. John Greenwald, Busted by Broadband, TIME, Mar. 26, 2001, at 34. Later
that same year, a consulting company, Ryan, Hankin & Kent, San Francisco, forecast that
Internet traffic would increase by a factor of forty-three between 1999 and 2003 (from 350,000
terabytes per month to over 15 million terabytes per month). Tom Grahame & David Kathan,
Internet Fuels Shocking Load Requests, ELECTRICAL WORLD, May-June 2001, at 25.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 230; Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 1998).
99. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Since an expectation of
privacy exists in e-mail transmissions made on the AOL service, we must look at the validity of
the warrant in order to determine whether it was properly obtained and executed.")
100. Anne Fadiman, Mail, 69 AM. SCHOLAR 7 (2000).
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much in common with receiving mail. Americans don't want the mail
carrier to be a cop and don't want ISPs to be cops. Other countries
have dealt with ISP liability in different ways, but have generally
granted them some type of immunity from suit.101
At the same time, passive ISPs are particularly vulnerable to suit
because they generally have deeper pockets than website owners and
are easier to find and sue. The cost of policing what the ISP is pas-
sively forwarding to another ISP would be massive, without any sub-
stantial benefits that cannot be achieved in other ways. Aside from
the practical benefits of absolving passive conduits of liability, re-
moving such liability also removes their incentive to fence by source,
location, or other overinclusive criteria, out of fear of suit.
4. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Fencing
Fence makers undoubtedly weigh the costs and benefits of
erecting the fence. A fence on a private website that keeps out whole
nations of consumers obviously costs the website owner the profits
from all those foregone sales. There may also be additional costs,
such as loss of first mover advantage102 or harm to a trademark oth-
erwise known worldwide.03 The benefits of greater certainty about
litigation and less need to budget for litigation may, however, out-
weigh those costs.
The benefits of public fencing may be less about money and
more about preserving national values or norms. Still there are costs.
Nations preventing their citizens from gaining access to sites from
around the world will have a less informed and potentially less pro-
ductive and innovative population. A less educated populace will be
less well equipped to play an active role in the global economy.
The proponents of an international convention on jurisdiction
and enforcement likely will want to deter overfencing to the extent
possible. By understanding the mechanisms for fencing, and the costs
and benefits, it may be easier to fashion better deterrents, to justify
101. See generally Scott Sterling, Note, International Law of Mystery: Holding Internet
Service Providers Liable for Defamation and the Need for a Comprehensive International
Solution, 21 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 327 (2001).
102. The first mover advantage means that the first to market with a particular product or
service in a market becomes known for that product or service and will only lose market share
to later comers who make improvements.
103. If a trademark owner creates a prominent mark on a global scale, but avoids doing
business in a specific country, someone else in that country-whether a competitor or
not-might start using the mark due to its recognition and good will.
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the preference for pluralism, and to increase the acceptability of the
convention as a whole.
IV. HOW THE DRAFT HAGUE CONVENTION AND DREYFUSS-
GINSBURG PROPOSAL STACK UP: WHAT IS RIGHT (AND WRONG)
WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND DREYFUSS-GINSBURG
PROPOSAL
For those situations where an international agreement on juris-
diction and enforcement of judgments might matter, what should that
agreement say? We next evaluate the Hague Convention and the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal in light of the values of uniformity, pre-
dictability, pluralism and openness (discussed in the preceding sec-
tion). We consider litigation in general, and then address the special
situation created by clickwrap contracts.
Like the draft Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
proposal, we discuss both jurisdiction and enforcement. Jurisdiction
is mostly a concern in what we will call the "first country," the one
where an initial judgment on the merits is sought. Enforcement is
largely an issue for the "second country"-the country whose courts
are asked to enforce the first country's judgment. The second coun-
try's courts are not so likely to have a jurisdiction problem, because
the second country is probably where the first-action loser has sub-
stantial assets or at least business operations, or, in the case of in rem
jurisdiction, where the first-action winner has located the thing
(goods, perhaps) over which enforcement of the judgment is
sought.104
A. Choice of First Country: Jurisdiction
The US and Europe105 take very different approaches to jurisdic-
tion.106 The Brussels and Lugano Conventions107 try to assign "exclu-
104. Thus, jurisdiction over the person or in rein is very likely to be present in the second
country.
105. Unfortunately, a discussion of how legal systems outside the US and Europe deal with
jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article. It will, however, be essential to consider the
rules of all potential signatories surrounding asserting jurisdiction for the Hague Convention, or
any other global jurisdiction agreement, to be a success. It will be particularly important to
consider the rules and needs of developing countries for the convention to gain acceptance
beyond the most developed nations of the world.
106. The comparison lacks total symmetry because US law applies among the states of a
single country, while the comparable provisions in Europe apply among countries.
107. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, July 28, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1418 (amending the original Brussels Convention with
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sive jurisdiction" to a single country, most often the defendant's
domicile.108 In cases dealing with "registered rights," only the country
of registration has jurisdiction.109 An exception is the case of torts, in
which the court where the injury occurred can have jurisdiction. The
European goal of exclusivity, however, can become a loophole when
there is more than one defendant. Then any country that is the
proper jurisdiction for one defendant is proper for all.uI0
In contrast, US law permits multiple state and federal courts to
assert jurisdiction over the same matter. Under US law, courts in
many geographical locations may have jurisdiction but (and the
"buts" are big ones) the court must have proper jurisdiction over each
defendant when there is more than one;"' it must also be a proper
venue for each defendant.112 Where the court does have personal ju-
risdiction and venue over all the parties, a challenge (a motion to
the addition of Spain and Portugal) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 28
I.L.M. 620, 623 (expanding the number of countries covered by the terms of the Brussels
Convention, commonly called the Lugano Convention); see also Council Regulation (EC)
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (containing regulations related
to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions). The rest of this Article will refer to the Brussels
Convention when discussing issues touched on by these three documents.
108. See Brussels Convention, article 2:
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be
governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.
28 I.L.M. 620, 623.
109. Brussels Convention, supra note 107, art. 16, § 4, at 627 ("The following courts shall
have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: .. . in proceedings concerned with the
registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be
deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration
has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an international convention
deemed to have taken place.")
110. Brussels Convention, supra note 107, art. 6, at 625 ("A person domiciled in a
Contracting State may also be sued: 1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts
for the place where any one of them is domiciled; 2. as a third party in an action on a warranty
or guarantee or in any other third party proceedings, in the court seised of the original
proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the object of removing him from the
jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in his case; 3. on a counterclaim arising from
the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the
original claim is pending; 4. in matters relating to a contract, if the action may be combined with
an action against the same defendant in matters relating to rights in rem in immovable property,
in the court of the Contracting State in which the property is situated.") It is predictable that if
a case is brought in a domicile that is absurdly inconvenient but proper as the domicile of one of
many defendants, the other defendants will object that the plaintiffs, merely to inconvenience
all the other defendants, included that defendant.
111. Hence, the need for federal courts to assert jurisdiction when there are parties of
multiple states under so-called "diversity jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III.
112. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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dismiss or transfer) can still be brought under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.113 The possibility of such motions, and their in-
creasingly frequent success, 114 is a check on forum shopping,115 as well
as something of a guarantee that the jurisdictional choice will be fair.
Under the Brussels Convention, there is nothing analogous to venue
or to forum non conveniens. Thus, the exceptions to the exclusive ju-
risdiction and domicile rules provide little protection to defendants
sued in distant foreign forums in multidefendant litigation.
1. The Proposals
a. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention is a hybrid convention, incorporating
some features of the US system and some features of the Brussels
Convention. It deals with the multitude of possible bases for jurisdic-
tion by creating white, gray, and black lists of required, permissible
and impermissible grounds for jurisdiction respectively. Some US
grounds, such as "doing business" and "tag jurisdiction"116 are
deemed impermissible.117 Jurisdiction is proper if there is personal
jurisdiction over the defendant(s), but like article 5(3) of the Brussels
Convention, it permits courts located where the injury occurred to as-
sert jurisdiction.18 Due to the possibility of multiple courts having ju-
risdiction, the Hague Convention adopts a form of forum non
conveniens in article 22. Choosing the required, permissible, and im-
permissible bases of jurisdiction will be an astoundingly complex issue
for a convention with as many signatories from diverse legal systems
as the Hague Convention. The lists will have to consider a wide array
of scenarios such as defective hairdryers purchased online, libel on a
113. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
114. Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at the End of the Twentieth Century:
Forum Conveniens and Forum Non Conveniens, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91, 106 (1999).
When foreign cases are dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, one study showed only 4
percent of those cases were subsequently brought in another jurisdiction. David W. Robertson,
Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 LAW Q.
REV. 398, 419 (1987).
115. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507.
116. Tag jurisdiction is based on serving defendants when they are in the State, regardless of
their domicile. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). It is rarely used in the United
States and is disfavored in many other countries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 307 cmt. (1987).
117. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 18.
118. Id. art. 10.
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website, identity theft, and civil assault actions. In addition, there are
competing special interests in each potential signatory country that
have strong feelings about which jurisdictional bases should be im-
permissible.
Harmonizing the bases of jurisdiction is vital to the Hague effort.
Without it, enforcing jurisdictions may tend to scrutinize the assertion
of jurisdiction by the first court in light of their own jurisdictional
rules, and may opt for nonenforcement more regularly. The wider
diversity of legal systems outside the EU further adds to the compli-
cations faced by the Brussels Convention drafters. Web-related
causes of action make harmonizing jurisdictional rules even more dif-
ficult, especially if a quasi-exclusive jurisdiction model like the Brus-
sels Convention is the starting point. Finally, the challenge of
multiple defendant suits involving multiple websites raises many of
the same concerns discussed in the context of the Brussels Conven-
tion.119
b. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal. Infringement Actions
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal begins by adopting the rule
shared by Brussels and US law that a defendant can be sued in its
domicile,20 a provision not likely to be controversial. Since the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal focuses on intellectual property, its ju-
risdictional rules for infringement cases are particularly important.
Infringement actions are discussed specifically in article 6. When de-
termining what court has jurisdiction when infringement by a web-
related activity is claimed, a threshold issue is: where is a website
"located"? The provisions of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal's in-
fringement jurisdiction article move away from the exclusive jurisdic-
tion model and focus on activities rather than the entity's location.
Article 6 focuses on activities that can be pinned down to a particular
119. We have similar concerns regarding the consolidation provisions of the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg proposal, article 13. See Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at
1080-81 (art. 13).
120. See id. at 1075 (art. 3):
1. Subject to the provisions of the Convention, a defendant may be sued in the
courts of the State where that defendant is habitually resident.
2. For the purposes of the Convention, an entity or person other than a natural
person shall be considered to be habitually resident in the State-
a. where it has its statutory seat,
b. under whose law it was incorporated or formed,
c. where it has its central administration, or
d. where it has its principal place of business.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
geographical location to avoid exposing potential defendants to suit
in every jurisdiction in which a website is viewed, for example.121
Article 6.1 sets forth three permissible grounds for jurisdiction:
Article 6 Infringement Actions
1. A plaintiff may bring an infringement action in the courts
of-
a. any State where defendant substantially acted (including
preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement, or
b. any State to which the alleged infringement was intention-
ally directed, including those States for which defendant took no
reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to that State,
or
c. any State in which the alleged infringement foreseeably oc-
curred unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting in
or directing activity to that State.122
The first two clauses contain phrases that attempt to curb juris-
diction over activities that reach the four corners of the earth solely
because the web does, as long as the potential defendant has exhib-
ited no special desire to be in that particular corner.
In article 6.1(a), the phrase "substantially acted" is limiting, but
"preparatory acts" may remove some of the limits. The discussion of
this article suggests it only applies to affirmative acts by the defen-
dant, such as setting up a server or running the business in a jurisdic-
tion.123 It does not, however, explicitly exclude basing jurisdiction on
acts by third parties. For example: consider someone who creates a
file-sharing network, permitting users to download the file-sharing
software anywhere in the world and then link their computer to the
network. If people in Japan add their computers to the network,
would article 6.1(a) confer Japanese jurisdiction over the network
creator in a suit unrelated the actions of the Japanese linkers? It
seems likely that something the network creator did could be con-
strued as a preparatory act, thereby making the network creator li-
able everywhere the software could be used. Once the network
creator makes sure the network is accessible everywhere, infringe-
121. This preference may underlie the statement in the Executive Summary Item 2, that
"intangible rights and infringements can be reified in too many locations to make personal
jurisdiction an effective limit on potential fora." Id. at 1069.
122. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added). Articles 6.2 and 6.3 contain limitations so that
adjudication on the merits is restricted to the injury upon which jurisdiction is based, unless
there is some other basis for jurisdiction for any other causes of action. Id.
123. Id.
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ment and therefore jurisdiction could occur anywhere under article
6.1(a).
The official notes on this article present a hypothetical that is
somewhat different:
For example, defendant may reside in State A, but make the al-
leged infringement available to the public through a website lo-
cated in State B. When jurisdiction is asserted on this basis, the
forum is competent to hear all infringement claims arising out of
the communication of the infringement from the forum, whatever
the territorial extent of the resulting infringements.1 24
The "forum" presumably refers to State B. Two questions re-
main: what if defendant and site are in State A, but the infringement
is in State B, and the infringement occurs there because of the action
of a third party? And perhaps more important, where is a website lo-
cated? Is it the location of the owner's web-connected computer or is
it anywhere anybody else's computer accesses the site? If a user op-
erates a computer that is physically in State B in order to access a site,
does that make the site located in State B? An affirmative answer
would seem to overexpose network designers and operators to for-
eign jurisdiction and would serve to discourage openness.
The second ground (article 6.1(b)) confers jurisdiction wherever
"the alleged infringement was intentionally directed, including those
States for which defendant took no reasonable steps to avoid acting in
or directing activity to that State."125 This standard is framed in an
unusual way, permitting the plaintiff who cannot show positive
(infringement-causing) acts by a potential defendant to demonstrate
jurisdiction by showing the absence of negative (infringement-
avoiding) acts.
The "positive acts" part of the second ground requires that the
defendant must have "intentionally directed" infringement to a state.
Putting aside how a person can "intentionally direct" an act of copy-
right infringement "to" a country, the word "intentionally" looks like
it protects defendants from suits being filed in unexpected places.
Yet maybe this is not the case. For example, is a site in Portuguese
intentionally targeted at Brazil? Does it need to take payment in
Brazilian currency? If it accepts credit cards, then presumably all
currencies handled by major credit cards are possible. Does that
make Brazilian infringement "intended"? Some copyright infringe-
124. Id. at 1109.
125. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
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ment activities, such as sending a digital copy of a file to another
computer, will not require any delivery to Brazil of a physical object
(other than streams of electrons or photons). But when a good is
sold, would "free shipping worldwide" create the intention to direct
infringement to Brazil? Websites employing English that do not re-
quire any payment are even more problematic. For example, a li-
brary or museum might operate a site that allowed people anywhere
in the world to download text or images that the library or museum
believed were not copyright protected at all or where the library or
museum announced that users were honor bound only to download if
they had a defense to any charges of infringement in their home
countries (such as fair use in the US).126 Would the owner of such a
site be subject to jurisdiction everywhere in the world under the "in-
tentionally directed" standard?
Creating a jurisdictional hook based on web-related activity that
is "intentionally directed to" countries seems likely to encourage
overfencing. The phrase needs to be tempered by the idea that the
"intentional directing" standard is not met by simply hooking up to
the web. That is an act "intentionally directed" to the world in gen-
eral, but not, by itself, proof of an intentional direction to any one
country in particular. Such a clarification would move this part of the
proposal127 closer to safeguarding openness and predictability.
But regardless of the breadth of the "intentionally directed"
clause when read alone, the "including" clause suggests that "intent"
can be proven by proving lack of intent to not do the act: a defendant
who "took no" reasonable steps to avoid infringement will be held,
for jurisdictional purposes, to have intended to infringe. The use of
the language "took no" instead of "failed to take" seems to betray a
bias in favor of taking jurisdiction wherever the plaintiff would like.
The two phrases are not identical: "failed to take" invokes a condi-
tion of some kind of duty on the defendant; "took no" is broader.
For example, a defendant without any knowledge (nor duty to obtain
that knowledge) that "reasonable steps" were needed, would be
guilty of having "taken no steps," though not necessarily of having
"failed to take any" steps. Imagine that a country wants to be a ha-
ven for copyright owners and enacts some new pro-owner statutes
that have no counterpart anywhere else in the world. A website
126. For example, supplying international interlibrary loans, which is permissible under US
law, might constitute infringement under the laws of the country of the receiving library.
127. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1077.
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owner with no reason to know of the country's new acts will not take
any steps to avoid infringing those laws, so the country will have ju-
risdiction under article 6.1(b). The adjective "reasonable" may not
necessarily be construed so that it both invokes the notion of duty to
act when one knew or should have known, as well as negates the no-
tion of duty to inquire.128 It would reduce the tension between plu-
ralism and openness if the article 6.1(b) standard required actual
infringement and direction at that country in particular, rather than
generalized access.
The third ground, article 6.1(c), has a structure almost parallel to
that of article 6.1(b) but with a twist. Both article 6.1(b) and article
6.1(c) use the phrase "acting in or directing activity to that State,"
words that cover far more kinds of conduct than simply infringing.
While this may assist in keeping the merits of the charge of infringe-
ment separate from the jurisdictional issue, it seems inappropriately
broad. The charge of infringement must be accepted as true during
the jurisdictional analysis, but if it is the basis of jurisdiction, then the
examination of the defendant's conduct should be limited to in-
fringement, not to anything that might constitute "acting in" a State,
or "directing activity to" it. Such breadth seems calculated to en-
courage substantial fence building by website owners.
Articles 6.1(b) and 6.1(c) employ a parallel structure, having two
clauses, the first of which opens a defendant to jurisdiction if the de-
fendant did something that shows an awareness that it will be oper-
ating in that country. Article 6.1(b) requires that an alleged
infringement be "intentionally directed to" a country, while article
6.1(c) permits jurisdiction in countries where the "alleged infringe-
ment foreseeably occurred."129 "Foreseeability" is a loaded word. On
the one hand, it suggests that the tort must in some sense have been
intentional, or at least that the defendant had knowledge of the exis-
tence of the plaintiff's claim to rights in the subject matter. For pat-
ent infringement, for example, that could eliminate some causes of
action.30 On the other hand, courts wishing to gain jurisdiction could
128. Even with the Internet and its successors, website owners cannot be expected to keep
up-to-date with worldwide copyright law developments, unless they are gluttons for
punishment.
129. Dreyfutss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1077.
130. Under US law a defendant who had no knowledge whatsoever that there was a patent
on the thing in question can nevertheless infringe that patent. This is different from copyright:
If 100 monkeys are given 100 word processors and somehow they type out A Painted
House, John Grisham has no cause of action for copyright infringement because the
monkeys did not copy. But if those 100 monkeys are given a fully equipped
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liberally construe the word "foreseeable" because any page posted
and unfenced on the web could foreseeably be seen anywhere in the
world. To the extent that copyright infringement is becoming a mat-
ter that everyone must worry about all the time131 and because, in the
realm of text, music and art, the appropriative nature of creation is
such that posting almost anything could be infringing at least the
copyright owner's exclusive right to create derivative works,132 the
foreseeability of copyright infringement merely by having a website
may be virtually a foregone conclusion.
But article 6.1(b) and 6.1(c) take different tacks in their second
clauses. Whereas 6.1(b)'s second clause begins with the word
including-that is, conferring jurisdiction in-those cases where a de-
fendant "took no reasonable steps to avoid" infringing, 33 the second
clause in 6.1(c) removes jurisdiction with an "unless" clause. Fore-
seeability of infringement will not create jurisdiction if the defendant
"took reasonable steps to avoid" infringement.134 This phrasing
seems like an open invitation to kill openness with defensive over-
fencing.
Depending on how courts interpret (a) and (b) of article 6.1,
paragraph (c) could either be invoked fairly frequently or rarely.
Most cases falling under (c) would also seem to fall under (a) or (b),
and (a) and (b) have the global reach that (c) may lack. If the usual
rules of statutory interpretation were applied, then 6.1(a) and 6.1(b)
should require high levels of action and intent respectively, and (c)
should require neither. Paragraph (c), then, would appear to be in-
cluded as an olfactory test: where the acts and intent are not terrible
but the defendant's behavior still has a fishy odor, jurisdiction will lie.
Yet the breadth of (c) is such that if there is agreement that (c) is a
good basis for jurisdiction, then (a) and (b) are not necessary.
pharmaceutical lab and somehow they make Claritin, Schering does have a cause of
action for patent infringement (that is, if Schering has claims in a patent that is in force
and that "reads on" the monkeys' composition or process). The fact that the monkeys
did not "copy" is irrelevant.
Roberta J. Morris, Open Letter to the Supreme Court Concerning Patent Law, 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 438, 446 n.14 (2001).
131. With the Internet, things as simple as forwarding E-mail, posting deep links, and
viewing framed content all raise complex copyright issues.
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
133. Both article 6.1(b) and article 6.1(c) use the phrase "acting in or directing activity to
that State," not "infringing." Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5. at 1077. As
explained supra p.1259, however, the added breadth of the former phrase may introduce more
bias than fairness in jurisdictional analysis, This term also covers far more than "infringing" and
may be less useful for purposes of discussion of these proposed provisions.
134. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1077.
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Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal limit
6.1(b) and all of 6.1, respectively. Again, they are in somewhat par-
allel form, but there are interesting differences as well as some dis-
tinctive similarities:
[6.21 If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the
basis of the intentional direction of the alleged infringement to that
State, then those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the
injury arising out of unauthorized use occurring in that State, unless
the injured person has his habitual residence or principal place of
business in that State.
[6.3] If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the
basis of the occurrence of the infringement in that State, then those
courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out
of unauthorized use occurring in that State.135
The notable similarity is the phrase "the injury arising out of un-
authorized use." It is unclear if a court would interpret it as narrower
or broader than "the infringement,"136 so the latter might be prefer-
able for clarity's sake.
It is also interesting to note that 6.2 has the "unless" clause but
6.3 does not. If "intentional direction" permits a court to adjudicate
matters other than infringement (or "injury arising out of the unau-
thorized use" if that is less than infringement), why should "the oc-
currence of the infringement" give the court less latitude than does
"intentional direction"? This difference suggests that the authors of
the proposal see the defendant's conduct in (c) as less culpable than
that of (b) yet "intentional direction" would seem to refer to a possi-
bly incomplete action, albeit one where there was "culpable" intent,
while "occurrence" refers to an unequivocally completed action, al-
beit possibly done innocently. If these two provisions are meant to
135. Id.
136. It would appear that the "injury" is certainly the "infringement." If "use" is also a
synonym for "infringement" (that is, if one cannot infringe except by "using"), then what does
the longer phrase do? On the other hand, "use" may be narrower than "infringement." It
certainly is in US patent law, where there is a quintet of verbs for actions that, if not authorized
by the patent owner, can subject the doer to liability for infringement. The five verbs are:
"make, use, offer to sell or sell, or import." See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a). Prior to
changes enacted in connection with GATT in 1994, the quintet was the trio of "make, use or
sell." Either way, "using" has never been the only action that literally and directly infringed a
patent. Thus, the injury arising out of unauthorized use might not be the injury for which the
patent owner seeks redress. A competitor who simply manufactured a machine, for example,
might perform very few unauthorized uses other than for quality control purposes, but might do
a substantial amount of damage via unauthorized "making" and "selling." Even a software
patent embodied in some downloadable software sold over the web might not be "used" by the
patent owner's competitor so much as "sold," after having been made (in the sense of the
computer code) only once and "used" by the competitor not at all except during testing. Thus
the phrase in 6.2 and 6.3 would nullify the court's jurisdiction almost entirely.
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limit jurisdiction when the cause of action is for enforcement of a
judgment from another state, rather than adjudication on the sub-
stance of a claim, this approach could be interpreted in very different
ways by different courts, thereby thwarting predictability.
c. Ideas for a Somewhat Different Approach
In an international convention limited to litigation over web-
related activities, it would seem that the system might be made more
open and more predictable (and less litigious, too), if jurisdiction
were not permitted until the parties had conferred (or the potential
plaintiff had made a reasonable effort to have a conference, and
could demonstrate that the potential defendant had resisted or been
unreachable).137 Such a system would be predicated on website own-
ers (the primary group expected to be defendants) providing a way
for the public to communicate with them. Registering a domain
name generally does just that.138 People who thought they had a
cause of action against a (foreign) website owner would have to make
a good-faith effort to notify that person and permit the site to take
remedial action first, as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. This would
eliminate the incentive to overfence while fostering pluralism and fa-
cilitating suits against unresponsive defendants.
2. Two "First" Countries: The Special Case of Declaratory
Judgment Actions
If there is no single forum with exclusive jurisdiction, a potential
plaintiff will likely forum shop. It might choose the court nearest its
headquarters or the one most likely to apply favorable laws. Both the
Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal assume that
the court "first seized" (meaning the court whose lawsuit was filed
earlier)39 is probably the right court, 40 but do provide exceptions.141
137. One analogy that comes to mind is the requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that motions cannot be filed until after an attempt has been made to confer and
resolve the issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A).
138. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting
alternate service by E-mail).
139. The phrase used is "the court first seized." The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal goes into
detail about determining the date a court is seized. See Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention,
supra note 5, at 1080 (art. 12.7).
7. For the purpose of this Article, a court shall be deemed to be seized-
a. at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent
document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently
failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the
defendant, or
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They also give defendants some protection against an onerous choice
of forum by a plaintiff, because both employ forum non conven-
iens-type language. 42 However, what they give to defendants there
they take away by disfavoring first actions if they are for a declaratory
judgment. 43
One reason for this is a fear that a potential defendant will initi-
ate a declaratory judgment action in a court that is known to move
very slowly, in order to buy time while the plaintiff is powerless. In
b. if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at the time
when it is received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the plaintiff
has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the
document lodged with the court.
Id.
The Hague Convention's virtually identical seizure section of the lis pendens provisions
is in article 21.5. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 21.5.
140. One of the exceptions to the preference for the first court is when the second court has
exclusive jurisdiction-for example, if a registered right (trademark) is at issue and the first
court is not the jurisdiction in which the contested mark was issued. Hague Convention, 2001
Draft, supra note 1, art. 12; Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1081 (art.
14.2).
141. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 22; Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft
Convention, supra note 5, at 1081 (art. 14- "Exceptional Circumstances for Declining
Jurisdiction").
142. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1081 (art. 14.2); Hague
Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 22.
143. Hague Convention article 21(6) states:
If in the action before the court first seized the plaintiff seeks a determination that
it has no obligation to the defendant, and if an action seeking substantive relief is
brought in the court second seized-
a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 5 [defining lis pendens procedures] above shall
not apply to the court second seized; and
b) the court first seized shall suspend the proceedings at the request of a party if
the court second seized is expected to render a decision capable of being recognised
under the Convention.
Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 21(6).
Article 12.5, Lis Pendens, of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal is almost identical:
5. If in the action before the court first seized, the plaintiff seeks a determination
that it has no obligation to the defendant, and if an action seeking substantive relief is
brought in the court second seized
a. the provisions of paragraphs 1-4 above shall not apply to the court second
seized, unless the declaratory judgment plaintiff has advanced its claim as part of an
action initiated before the court first seized by the declaratory judgment defendant,
and
b. the court first seized shall suspend the proceedings at the request of a party if
the court second seized is expected to render a decision capable of being recognized
under the Convention.
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1080 (art. 12.5). Both provisions suffer
from the infelicitous use of the preposition "before" with the object "court" not to mean
"before in time" but to mean "before the court" in the sense of "in front of a judge in a
courtroom setting." This forces many a reader to have to read the provision several times. The
opening clause, "If in the action before the court first seized, the plaintiff seeks a
determination" might perhaps be changed to something like, "If the plaintiff in the first action
(defined as that brought in the court 'first seized') seeks only a determination .. "
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
the European Community, this tactic has been called an "Italian tor-
pedo" or "Belgian torpedo" because both countries have slow legal
systems.144 Another fear is that whichever court hears the action will
choose to apply its own law. The underlying assumption that this
choice will be less appropriate in a declaratory judgment action than
an action for substantive relief seems biased in favor of traditional
plaintiffs.145
Consider this situation: the declaratory judgment action is
brought (1) first chronologically, (2) in a country with a reasonably
fast legal system, and (3) in the country that has the closest relation-
ship to the case. The action for substantive relief is brought (1) sec-
ond chronologically, (2) in a country that has a "rocket docket," and
(3) in a country with a more tenuous relationship to the case. In such
a situation, there should be no reason to remove the case from the
court first seized, even though it was for a declaratory judgment ac-
tion.
To improve uniformity and predictability, the presumption in fa-
vor of the first court seized should not be burst simply because the
first action is for a declaratory judgment. Instead, it should be rebut-
table. Proceedings should not be suspended in favor of a later-filed
action pending in a court in a different country unless the second
court has a proper basis for jurisdiction and has a substantially greater
connection to the dispute than the first court. Because of the "tor-
pedo" experience in Europe, 146 the presumption might also be rebut-
table "where justice requires"-to cover such cases as where the first
country's courts will prevent the declaratory judgment defen-
dants/substantive relief plaintiffs from having their underlying action
adjudicated in a timely fashion.
A more objective standard would replace the weighing of the
connections between the various forums and the cause of action with
an examination only of the connection to the first court. Unless that
connection was insubstantial, the first-filed action would proceed.
The idea here is to avoid outlandish forum shopping by either
party, and to encourage forum choice that makes sense on the facts of
the case1 47 without making any assumptions about which status (sub-
144. Mario Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo, E.I.P.R., July
1997.
145. See infra Section IV.B.
146. Franzosi, supra note 144.
147. For an example of how such a standard could be applied, see the jurisprudence
surrounding Uniform Commercial Code article 1-105 and the "reasonable relation" test.
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stantive relief plaintiff or declaratory judgment plaintiff) is more
likely to make a choice that is legitimate. The values of uniformity
and pluralism may be given somewhat more weight here than the
value of predictability, but the value of openness is also respected.
B. Choice of Law (and Using Enforcement As a Stick)
In web-related causes of action, there may be a dispute about
what country's laws to apply. Indeed, no matter who it is who is fo-
rum shopping, whether a plaintiff with several forums to choose from
or a potential defendant deciding to institute a declaratory judgment
action before the plaintiffs file their substantive suit, one factor that
will be considered is the substantive law likely to be chosen in each
possible forum. Litigants undoubtedly assume that most judges will
resolve any doubts about which law to apply in favor of their own. It
is a reasonable assumption.148 It is the law they are most comfortable
with and they may also be convinced that it is normatively the "best,"
based on acculturation, training, or even an extensive study of com-
parative law.
Each forum has and is permitted, consistent with the Hague
Convention, to have its own rules to determine the choice of law. It
makes sense to encourage judges to apply the law of the country with
the greatest connection to the action even when it is not the forum,
and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal embraces this idea in an in-
triguing way. It does not break with the Hague Convention. Coun-
tries may still have their own choice of law rules, and those rules will
be applied for cases subject to the Hague Convention/Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg proposal just as they are applied to any other cases brought
in that country's courts. 49 But the choice of law determination may
have an impact beyond the initial lawsuit if an enforcement action is
likely. That is because the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal uses en-
forcement as a stick (or a small wand in the hand of a party wishing to
convince a court to make a particular choice of law). The section on
148. "[J]udges are presumably familiar with their own state law and may find it difficult and
time consuming to discover and apply correctly the law of another State." Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. An alternative would be for the convention to include a general choice of law rule
instead of addressing the issue only in connection with enforcement actions. This has some
appeal, since it would enhance predictability. Of course it would lead to courts having two sets
of choice of law rules-one for Hague-governed cases, and one for other international cases.
But this may not be so troubling. In the vast majority of cases, the two will very likely yield the
same result. Where they diverge, enforcing courts probably will defer to the decisions made by
the original courts.
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enforcement-there is no section on choice of law itself, though it is
mentioned in the Executive Summary-permits nonenforcement of
judgments when the choice of law by the original court is "arbitrary
or unreasonable."150
If a court that properly has jurisdiction chooses to apply its own
law, it seems highly unlikely that another court will determine that
the first court failed the "arbitrary and unreasonable" test. Judges
are not, and should not be, suspicious of the wisdom and decency of
other judges, even if they are in "enemy" countries. Branding fellow
judges "arbitrary and unreasonable" is likely to be distasteful, espe-
cially to non-appellate judges. There will thus be a subtle pressure on
the judge in the second country to brush off any motion against en-
forcement based on choice of law unless it is truly egregious. More-
over, evaluation of another court's choice of law analysis is difficult:
imagine an Indian court trying to determine whether a German court
correctly applied German choice of law rules when it decided to apply
German law instead of Portuguese. The "arbitrary or unreasonable"
standard may simply telegraph to the judge that deep analysis is un-
necessary.
Another way the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal seeks to affect the
choice of law decision is in the suggestion that the court choose a law
with "sufficient significant relationship" to the dispute.151 Although
this is fine in principle, once websites are accessible everywhere,
every country in which a site is viewed could arguably be considered
related to the dispute, negating this as a narrowing factor.
A better standard might be one where a court could refuse to en-
force a judgment from another country when the judgment was
predicated on a choice of law that was not "justified." This would en-
courage judgment-issuing courts to provide an explanation for the law
they chose. Only if that explanation were entirely lacking or funda-
mentally incoherent would the enforcing court be permitted to re-
open the entire choice of law analysis.
150. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1086 (art. 25.1(h)).
151. Id. (art. 25.1(h)).
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C. Choice of Second Country: Enforcement of Judgments
1. The Goal of Routine Enforcement
After a court in a first country has rendered a judgment, the
plaintiff may wish to enforce the judgment in another jurisdiction.
The Hague Convention begins with the presumption that enforce-
ment is the rule, specifically prohibits a review on the merits by the
second country's courts,152 and then carves out some exceptions. The
idea is to make enforcement routine, honoring the values of uniform-
ity and predictability at some possible expense to pluralism.
An underlying rationale for permitting transnational enforce-
ment actions is judicial economy: if a court has already held a full trial
on the merits of the action and come to a decision, then another court
should not have to do the same thing all over again. Another ration-
ale is justice or fairness (and economy) to the winning party (what we
may call "winner take all"). The winner in the first court has gone
though the expense of time, money and energy to prevail in the first
action, and should not have to do the same thing all over again.
The concept of routine enforcement of foreign judgments may
feel simultaneously familiar and surprising to US actors. "Expected,
but not engraved in stone" might better represent our expectations.
On the one hand, in common law jurisprudence an action to enforce
another court's judgment is directed to the equity jurisdiction of the
second court. 5 3 Routine and equity can coexist, but not completely
peacefully. Equity suggests a case-by-case, all-the-facts-and-circum-
stances kind of analysis, including, perhaps, sua sponte decisions by
the judge.154 Routine suggests that no analysis is necessary or, any-
way, that none will be done. On the other hand, the US Constitution
has the Full Faith and Credit Clause,155 which ensures that enforce-
ment among the states is expected-subject to the defendant in the
152. Hague, supra note 1, art. 28.2: "Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the
purpose of application of the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of
the judgment rendered by the court of origin." This is one of the places where the Hague uses
the "thou shalt not" model rather than the "encouragement" model.
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 481
(1987) ("Judgments granting injunctions.., are not generally entitled to enforcement.");
Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Indus. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Del. 1984); Airbus Industrie
G.I.E v. Patel, [1999] 1 A.C. 119 (1998) (appeal taken from Eng.).
154. See FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b).
155. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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second action showing lack of equity.156 The principle of comity be-
tween the state and federal court systems cements our expectations
about mutual enforcement. Comity also governs courts in the federal
system enforcing judgments of courts of other countries. In addition,
many states have enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.157 Thus, US actors thinking about their rights
against others, rights they might have to assert in foreign courts,
might guess that those judgments would routinely be enforceable in
the US. If they thought about their own vulnerability to a judgment
an opponent might win and then might seek to enforce against the US
actors' foreign assets (if they had any) and if they assumed a symmet-
ric world, they would also expect routine enforcement around the
world. What they might not appreciate is that foreign countries may
well refuse to enforce US judgments, not because of lack of reciproc-
ity, but because those countries reject the jurisdictional philosophy of
US courts.
Reciprocal enforcement presupposes that both the judgment-
issuing court and the judgment-enforcing court share basic views
about all relevant matters leading up to the judgment, in particular
the substantive law of the liability issues. That is often not true. But
because a strong motive to have a convention at all arises from the
fairly universal view that not having to retry every case on the merits
is better than its opposite, the Convention needs to confront the dis-
parity between assumption and reality. To respect pluralism while
striving for uniformity, the enforcing court should accept the findings
of the original court, determine which law would apply had the case
been brought in the enforcing jurisdiction, and determine what reme-
dies would have been available. By accepting the findings of the
original court, the enforcing court can often avoid retrying the case
and losing the judicial economy while respecting the cultural basis for
rejecting certain types of damages.
The supposition that the judgment-issuing and judgment-
enforcing courts are applying parallel laws is true in at least one situa-
tion: where the subject matter of the lawsuit is covered by TRIPs158
156. Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp, 522 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1998); Polly J. Price,
Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 793-817 (1998).
157. UFMJRA, supra note 67. Thirty of the fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia
and the US Virgin Islands, have adopted the UFMJRA, including almost all the most populous
ones: California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan.
Uniform Law Comm'rs, supra note 66.
158. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8; International Union for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, signed at Berne, Sept. 9, 1896 (additional act and declaration signed at Paris,
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and both courts are in countries that belong to TRIPs. In such cases,
one would expect the enforcing court to find laws that map closely to
the laws applied in the original case. This plus the TRIPs enforce-
ment obligation means that transnational enforcement, at least at the
TRIPs baseline if not above it, could become routine.
2. What Is Being Enforced?
An action for enforcement asks the second court to respect
everything the first court did, starting with its initial decision (or as-
sumption, if there is no challenge) that it had jurisdiction over the
defendant, and continuing all the way to whatever remedy is under
consideration in the enforcement action. The action for enforcement
thus is based on many things that may or may not be worthy of re-
spect, and may or may not have been done the way courts in the sec-
ond country would have done them if the action had been brought
there originally. There is a whole "tree" of issues (litigated or not)
where national differences may be lurking. One way to identify the
branches is to think of a lawsuit both in the abstract but also chrono-
logically from complaint to judgment, and to make successive divi-
sions. First there is "procedure" and "substance." "Procedure,"
which is rife with "due process" considerations, can be divided in turn
between "jurisdiction" and "the process thereafter." "The process
thereafter" can be divided between "theory" and "practice": "theory"
applies to whether the rules in general are fair; "practice" looks at
whether what happened in the specific case was fair. "Substance"
(which is that which is not procedure) can be divided into "liability"
and "remedies." "Liability" examines the substantive law governing
the cause of action. "Remedies" can be divided into "money" and
"6non-money."159
May 4, 1896; revised at Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908; additional protocol at Berne, Mar. 20, 1914;
revised at Rome, June 2, 1928; revised at Paris, July 24, 1971).
159. See infra tbl. 1 ("Issue Tree").
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Table 1: Issue Tree
i la) i I
Jurisdiction Res ede
Theory I Practice Money Non-Money
Other or additional divisions may be possible or better but in any
case the idea is to observe which branches are given specific attention
by the Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, and
which are not. One question to ponder is whether the difference in
attention reflects sensible choices about when to honor pluralism and
when to honor predictability (and judicial economy), or simply re-
flects ease of articulation, or embodies the concerns of a specific con-
stituency, or is what is politically necessary for a workable
multilateral convention on the topic. If the difference in attention is
not justified by what is at stake for the parties or the nations (whose
laws will be disrespected), what changes should be made?
Every branch of the tree may embody deeply held national be-
liefs, but undoubtedly some branches could be the subject of com-
promise and harmonization for countries motivated by the promise of
the benefits of the Convention. Other branches represent potential
compromises that nations are not willing to give up. The position on
the tree does not determine whether that branch is harmonizable or
not.
A convention that values pluralism60 will need to tread lightly
when it addresses the enforcement of foreign judgments as well as the
harmonization of substantive law. Compromises will be needed with
regard to defining those bases of jurisdiction that will be acceptable
internationally, as well as identifying largely acceptable types of
remedies. The proposals acknowledge the need for pluralism in sub-
stantive law and choice of law, but boldly attempt to harmonize the
similarly challenging area of procedural law.
160. See supra Section III.C.
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3. Provisions for Nonenforcement
a. The Hague Approach
The Hague Convention's enforcement provisions, articles 26161
and 28,162 are written in "thou shalt not" (or "thou may not") rather
than "thou shalt" or "thou ought" form. This may be a reflection of
the preference that enforcement should be routine and nonenforce-
ment be the exception. It is also the way the UFMJRA is phrased.163
161. Hague article 26:
A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction which conflicts with Article 4, 5, 7, 8
or 12, or whose application is prohibited by virtue of Article 18, shall not be recognised
or enforced.
Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 26.
The footnote for this provision, Hague footnote 149, states that the cross-referenced
articles are still under consideration. The currently referenced articles are: 4: agreements on
choice of forum; 5: time limits on contesting jurisdiction; 7: consumer contracts; 8: employment
contracts; 12: exclusive jurisdiction for proceedings in rem, declaratory judgments concerning
"legal persons," and those involving registered rights; and 18: prohibited grounds of jurisdiction.
Two of these articles, 4 and 7, are discussed below at Subsections IV.D.1 and IV.D.2,
respectively.
162 Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 28.
Article 28 Grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused [only] if-
a) proceedings between the same parties and having the same subject matter are
pending before a court of the State addressed, if first seized in accordance with Article
21;
b) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment rendered, either in the State
addressed or in another State, provided that in the latter case the judgment is capable
of being recognised or enforced in the State addressed;
[c) the [judgment results from] proceedings [in the State of origin were]
incompatible with fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed,
[including the right of each party to be heard by an impartial and independent court];]
d) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document,
including the essential elements of the claim, was not notified to the defendant in
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence [, or was
not notified in accordance with [an applicable international convention] [the domestic
rules of law of the State where such notification took place]], unless the defendant
entered an appearance and presented his case without contesting the matter of
notification in the court of origin, provided that the law of that court permits objection
to the matter of notification and the defendant did not object.
e) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;
f) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public
policy of the State addressed.
Id.
163. Section 4 of the UFMJRA provides:
SECTION 4. [Grounds for Non-recognition]
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
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The similarities and differences between the UFMJRA and the
Hague, and the reasons behind them, are beyond the scope of this
Article, but the straightforward comparison is instructive.164
Article 26 covers situations (mostly defined by the subject matter
of the suit) where the assertion of jurisdiction would conflict with
some other provision of the Convention.165 A few of these-contracts
specifying choice of law, and contracts involving consumers-are dis-
cussed below.166
General grounds for nonenforcement are enumerated in article
28.167 Article 28.1(a) and (b) address what may be the easy cases:
those where either a parallel action on the merits is pending in the
same country as that in which the enforcement action has been
brought (28.1(a)) or where there are two conflicting judgments
(28.1(b)). Article 28.1(d) addresses due process concerns at the com-
plaint stage. Article 28.1(e) permits nonenforcement in cases of pro-
cedural fraud. Although 28.1(d) and 28.1(e) are important, they
require inquiry into the facts of a particular case and thus are unlikely
to conflict with national procedural rules.
The two other grounds, 28.1(c) and 28.1(f) are the ones that
come closest to a requirement simply that enforcement be "equita-
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of
the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was
a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
UFMJRA, supra note 67, § 4.
164. See Brand, supra note 53, at 197-99.
165. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 26.
166. Infra Section IV.D.
167. The most recent draft of article 28 includes the bracketed word "only" before the "if"
and the Hague states, "The insertion of the word 'only' has been proposed to make clear that
the following list is an exclusive list of grounds for refusal or enforcement, see Preliminary
Document No. 11, at p.102. No consensus was reached on the inclusion of this word in the
text." Hague Convention, 1999 Draft, supra note 1, at n.153. (Since the word "only"
contradicts the existence of article 26, some redrafting is needed in any event.) Without the
word "only," the existence of an apparently catch-all provision in 28.1(f) does not really resolve
whether clause (f) is purposely meant to be coincident with-or purposely narrower than-the
application of general equitable principles. The strength of the language of 28.1(f), especially
the word "manifestly," suggests that the drafters intend a loophole with a smaller circumference
than equity, and that in turn suggests that whoever inserted "manifestly" is in favor of "only."
See discussion of § 28.1(f) infra.
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ble" (or rather, "not inequitable") while also honoring pluralism. Ar-
ticle 28.1(c) permits nonenforcement where the proceedings in the
first country were "incompatible with fundamental principles of pro-
cedure" of the second country. Article 28.1(f) permits nonenforce-
ment when to do otherwise would be "manifestly incompatible with
the public policy" of the second country.
The "procedural incompatibility" clause, article 28.1(c), has not
received agreement by the drafters, as shown by the fact that it is
completely in brackets: "[c) the [judgment results from] proceedings
[in the State of origin were] incompatible with fundamental principles
of procedure of the State addressed, [including the right of each party
to be heard by an impartial and independent court]."
Article 28.1(c) is an attempt to address the wide variety in rules
of civil procedure among the countries likely to be contracting parties
to the Convention. It also might reassure citizens of nations who fear
they could lose a case because of foreign civil procedure that is unfair
but not so bad as to meet the higher standards of procedural fraud
(28.1(e)) or "manifest[] incompatib[ility] with the public policy" of
the country where the enforcing court is located (28.1(f)). If some
version of the first part of 28.1(c) is retained, the second
part-specifying as an example of "incompatibility" the absence of an
"impartial and independent court"-is in additional brackets. De-
pending on the generality of any first part that is agreed to, the need
to provide the example may be less pressing.168
If the entire procedural incompatibility section is deleted, those
who feel they have been the victims of foreign procedure may have
two 169 fallback provisions. Their case may fall into one of the catego-
ries of article 26, but if it does not, then they may be able to argue
that "recognition or enforcement [of the judgment tainted by proce-
dural incompatibility] would be manifestly incompatible with the
public policy" of the country of the enforcing court (article 28.1(f)).
This would broaden the scope of the public policy exception to in-
clude procedure as well as substance. That should not be objected to,
but the narrowness of the language of 28.1(f) (manifest incompatibil-
168. Lurking behind the "impartial and independent court" clause in 28.1(c) may be the
concern that some entire court systems may be so flawed that routine non-enforcement is
preferable. Such a concern might reflect hubris, arrogance or prejudice on the part of the
enforcing court/country, but it also might reflect substantial differences in the worldview
between the two legal systems. If the drafters' lack of agreement jettisons all of 28.1(c), or
jettisons this clause, there may still be a need for language to address this specific situation.
169. Or three provisions, if general equitable principles remain available. See supra text
accompanying notes 65, 153-54.
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ity, the public policy) suggests that defendants will meet with little
success when they urge nonenforcement of a judgment founded on
procedural flaws unrelated to lack of jurisdiction.170
b. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal in articles 24 and 25 follows
fairly closely the Hague Convention's grounds for nonenforcement of
foreign judgments.171 It provides due process in connection with pro-
cedural incompatibility and the public policy exception, much like the
Hague Convention. 72 The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal expands into
some new areas, however, providing exceptions for nonnegotiated
contracts173 and nonenforcement based on choice of law.174
170. See supra note 161 (quoting Hague art. 26); Art 28.1(f) is discussed further below. See
infra Subsection IV.C.3.d.
171. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal says:
Article 24. Judgments Not to be Recognized or Enforced
A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction which conflicts with Articles 4, 5, 7
or 8], or whose application is prohibited by virtue of Article 16, shall not be
recognized or enforced.
Article 25. Grounds for Refusal of Recognition or Enforcement
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if-
a. proceedings between the same parties and having the same subject matter are
pending before a court of the State addressed, if first seized in accordance with Article
12 or if consolidated in accordance with Article 13;
b. the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the court first seized, or if
the actions were consolidated in accordance with Article 13, the judgment is
inconsistent with the judgment of the court of consolidation;
c. the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document,
including the essential elements of the claim, was not notified to the defendant in
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the defendant to arrange for a defense;
d. the rendering court's jurisdiction was based on a nonnegotiated contract
whose forum designation was unreasonable under Article 4.3.
e. The judgment results from proceedings incompatible with fundamental
principles of procedure of the State addressed, including the right of each party to be
heard by an impartial and independent court;
f. the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;
g. recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public
policy of the State addressed;
h. where the rendering court's choice of law was arbitrary or unreasonable, for
example, where it applied a law lacking sufficient significant relationship to the
dispute. The conformity of the forum to the jurisdictional terms of this Convention
does not necessarily, of itself, suffice to establish a significant relationship between its
laws and the dispute.
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the purpose of application of
the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of the judgment
rendered by the court of origin.
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1085-86 (arts. 24, 25).
172. Compare Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 28.1(c) & (f), with Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1086 (arts. 25.1(e) & (g)).
173. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1086 (art. 25.1(d)); see also infra
text accompanying notes 206-34.
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c. The Public Policy Exception and Pluralism
While the Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg pro-
posal attempt to harmonize procedural rules related to jurisdiction,
there is no attempt to harmonize substantive national law. To some
extent the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal's requirement of TRIPs
membership achieves that, but there will always be variations be-
tween countries.175 To balance pluralism with the need to avoid hav-
ing the most lax or restrictive national law become the global norm,
there must be a safety valve. The public policy exception is just that.
The fear is that the valve will be either overused or underused.
Among the reasons for underuse are (1) that the legislative history of
the Hague Convention showed that the goal was to make enforce-
ment routine, and (2) public policy as applied by civil law courts as
ordre public is often an even more stringent standard than public
policy as interpreted by US courts. Once the conventional wisdom is
that the public policy exemption is toothless, it will only be invoked
by the most desperate. If it is underinvoked, then national values will
suffer whenever monsters created in the laboratories of other nations
are enforced elsewhere, effectively exporting bad laws. Additionally,
forum shopping for the first country will be encouraged and defensive
fencing will increase. These results will be to the detriment of open-
ness, as well as pluralism, although uniformity and predictability
could benefit.
The public policy exception may not be able single-handedly to
preserve pluralism. Still, trying to define additional exceptions, per-
haps topical176 or geographic177 exceptions, seems only to complicate
174. Id. (art. 25.1(h)); supra text accompanying notes 232-33 (discussing article 25.1(h)).
175. Examples discussed previously include database protection (European Database
Protection Directive, 96/9/EC, March 11, 1996; the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1322 (West Supp. 2000) and
24 U.S.C. § 4001)); strict moral rights laws (Fr. Code de la propri~t6 intellectuelle, Art. L. 121-
1(3); see, e.g., Huston v. Turner Entertainment, 1991 Cass. le civ., at 197 (involving film
colorization)); public lending rights (Public Lending Right Act 1979 (U.K.)); and "business
method" patents (State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999)).
176. Topical exceptions could include amending the public policy nonenforcement
subsection to permit nonenforcement when "health and safety are at issue." Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
article 31 proposed this in the context of nonenforcement of final injunctions. See Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1088 (art. 31). Other topical exceptions might
permit nonenforcement when enforcement would "discourage innovation or basic research" or
"would conflict with fundamental social or cultural (or socio-cultural) or policies in the State
where enforcement is sought." The problem with all these examples is that it is hard to know
how, when and if courts might apply them. They are as subject as the public policy exception to
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matters. Other related standards, such as the exceptions in the Uni-
form Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act178 and the judicially
constructed public interest or fundamental interest179 test might be
added or substituted, but they do not seem any better calculated to
preventing over- or underuse of the exception while protecting
against the exportation of bad laws.
over- and underuse, and to repercussions from singular (in both senses) court decisions that
grab the public's attention.
177. If the concern is that some courts have considered sub-federal policy as public policy,
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997), affd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10628, thereby
overusing the exception, a solution might be to change the phrase to public policy or national
values. This broadens the exception from ordre public while narrowing it by excluding sub-
federal policies. Unfortunately, geographic limitations work no better than topical limitations.
Trying to constrain the public policy to the higher threshold of international public policy or
national public policy does not improve the exception's ability to limit enforcement of extreme
national laws.
178. "A foreign judgment need not be recognized if the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on
which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this State." UFMJRA, supra
note 67, § 4(b)(3). The bracketed options permit the state to choose one or the other.
Most of the states that have enacted the UFMJRA have chosen "cause of action"
rather than "claim for relief." Two have chosen to use both of the bracketed phrases. At least
one has substituted "contrary to" for "repugnant to" (Iowa).
The focus on cause of action/claim for relief limits the public policy exception
(apparently) to the substantive law applied to liability issues. One distinction between the
Hague/Dreyfuss-Ginsburg version and the UFMJRA version is that the phrasing of the
Hague/Dreyfuss-Ginsburg version permits a defendant to argue that the particular public policy
deserving of respect is embedded in the remedies or even the procedure related to a given
judgment.
179. A revised version of article 28 that incorporates these tests could read: "Article 28
Grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement[:] 1. Recognition or enforcement of a
judgment may be refused if: recognition or enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to
important [public] [fundamental] interests of the State addressed."
United States courts generally recognize foreign judgments and decrees unless
enforcement would be prejudicial or contrary to the country's interests. See Somportex Ltd. v.
Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972)
("Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the
interest of the nation called upon to give it effect."); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A] state is not required to give effect to
foreign judicial proceedings grounded on policies which do violence to its own fundamental
interests."); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[R]equirements for
enforcement of a foreign judgment expressed in Hilton are that. . . the original claim not violate
American public policy,.., that it not be 'repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent
and just in the State where enforcement is sought."' (citations omitted)).
It is assumed that all scenarios that would have met the public policy exception would
also meet this one. By escaping the traditionally underused "public policy" rubric, this test
might be able to serve as a more effective safety valve to permit nonenforcement when a law
does not meet the "public policy" threshold. Additionally, there is less concern about overuse
because the interests are required to be both important and public, preventing a private interest
or an unimportant interest from meeting this standard. Nonenforcement under article 28.1(f)
should be based only on broad societal values, such as promoting research, education,
innovation, or competition, rather than protecting the citizens of their jurisdiction. To the
extent that public policy exceptions are rarely invoked, the hope is that the important public
interests test will serve as an exception with bite.
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d. Parsing the Public Policy Exception
Articles 28.1(f) of the Hague Convention and 25.1(g) of the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal both permit a second country's court to
refuse to recognize or enforce a judgment if doing so would be "mani-
festly incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed."t80
The clause employs a very strong adverb, "manifestly," and a
definite article, "the public policy," to keep the exception narrow.
That is in accordance with the idea that transnational enforcement
should be routine (and that enforcement should be uniform and pre-
dictable). It also suggests that the drafters see underuse of the excep-
tion as preferable to overuse.
The use of the definite article "the" for "public policy" might
suggest to an observer from another planet that there is some very
well-defined group of concepts that anybody who wanted to under-
stand the applicability of this exception could study. Yet we know of
no such archive in any country. This detracts from predictability, un-
less, of course, all players understand the subtext-that the exception
should never be used. That could certainly be the case if nobody suc-
cessfully argues the exception during the early years of the Conven-
tion.
If "manifestly" were deleted, or replaced with something milder
("substantially"?),181 and if "the" were replaced with "a," the public
policy exception would have more teeth. But then the exception
might be subject to overuse, with detrimental effects on public per-
ception about uniformity and predictability. Those detriments would,
however, likely be short-term, assuming that judges were careful, in-
telligent and fair in applying the exception, and applied the exception
to cases that objective observers would agree are appropriately re-
spectful of pluralism. (For example, the US would not enforce libel
judgments that violated the First Amendment and France would not
enforce contracts conveying moral rights.)
180. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 28.1(f); Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft
Convention, supra note 5, at 1086 (art. 25.1) (emphasis added).
181. To counteract the effect of removing "manifestly" it might be advisable to replace
"incompatible" with something stronger and more pointed, such as "inconsistent," or even to
recast the clause to use a verb instead of an adjective, and one that speakers of American
English associate with public policy, something like "recognition or enforcement may be refused
when recognition or enforcement would violate a public policy of the State addressed."
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
e. The Counterpart Test
Public policy is an amorphous concept, particularly when applied
to all substantive and procedural aspects of a foreign legal system.
How does one know if a foreign law violates domestic public policy?
To help focus this inquiry, it is helpful to look at how the relevant law
of the first country differs from the most similar law of the second
country. For example, suppose the first country prohibits distribution
of tools that can be used for copyright infringement if they have "a
substantial likelihood of an infringing use" and the enforcing country
has a standard that permits tools that have "a substantial noninfring-
ing use." It is reasonable to suggest that although similar, there is a
policy difference between the two. In the first, there is more of a pre-
sumption of guilt, whereas in the enforcing country, there is a pre-
sumption of innocence. By considering the differences between the
laws, the court can better expand upon the policy issues in the case
and increase predictability in future cases.
Clearly, if the two laws are identical, very similar, or the latter is
broader than the former, then the two countries have similar public
policies and enforcement is almost certain. If the enforcing country
does not have a similar law, has a narrower law, lacks a law in that
area, or has a law with fundamentally different standards or burdens
of proof, then the question is whether the difference embodies a pub-
lic policy of the enforcing jurisdiction. If that is the case, then the en-
forcing country should consider nonenforcement.
There are, of course, situations where looking for a counterpart
law is not all that helpful to the public policy analysis. There may
even be some situations where the counterpart analysis points one
way but "all the facts and circumstances" suggest the opposite result.
This would be most likely to occur when the substantive law would
lead to the counterpart analysis result, but an equitable doctrine, such
as unclean hands, leads the enforcing court to not enforce the judg-
ment.
A last comfort for plaintiffs is that enforcement is the rule, not
the exception, and the language in article 28 employs the permissive
may, rather than the mandatory shall. Thus, judges can enforce
judgments that are incompatible with an important public interest:
they are allowed to do equity in this regard either way.
If the Convention is a success and frequently used, then within a
few years sufficient jurisprudence will develop to enhance the pre-
dictability of enforcement.
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4. Remedies and Their Subsequent Enforcement Transnationally
Like other areas of substantive and procedural law, each nation's
law on remedies embodies particular cultural views about litigation
and justice, views that may not resonate with everyone all over the
world. For example, the US awards punitive damages in some tort
cases, issues preliminary injunctions in intellectual property cases
with a fair degree of regularity, may grant statutory damages in copy-
right cases182 and, in patent cases, may multiply damages by a number
between one and three for "willful" infringement.183 In intellectual
property cases, a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing
party, including to an accused infringer when the intellectual property
rights are invalid and the asserting owner's conduct warrants that
remedy.184 Payment of the other side's attorney fees is otherwise the
exception in US jurisprudence,185 but in Great Britain it is standard.186
While a US court might be willing to enforce a money judgment for
attorney fees entered by a British court, a British court might balk at
awarding punitive damages for deliberate copyright infringement,
and many countries might be reluctant to enforce any kind of injunc-
tion awarded by another country but affecting conduct or things in
their own country.
As these examples suggest, remedies can be divided into two and
two again: money damages and injunctions are the two main
branches. Money damages come in two kinds. First, there are those
such as compensatory damages that are widely accepted (or mutually
accepted, if we are thinking in terms of a particular case with an issu-
ing court and an enforcing court, rather than the more abstract situa-
tion of an international convention). Second, there are those such as
punitive damages, or damages for "pain and suffering" that are rare
(or in a two-country hypothetical, those with no counterpart in the
enforcing country). Injunctions also come in two kinds: provisional
ones like preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders, and
permanent ones issued after a full trial on the merits.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2002).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2002); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
184. Copyright: 17 U.S.C. § 505; patent: 35 U.S.C. § 285; trademark: Lanham Act § 35(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a). Both the patent and copyright statutes came into play in Hughes v. Novi Am.,
Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 123 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
185. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994).
186. Id.; Charles W. Branham, III, It Couldn't Happen Here: The English Rule-But Not in
South Carolina, 49 S.C. L. REV. 971, 975 (1998).
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In the discussion that follows, the focus will be on substantive
matters (the basis for liability and the determination of the remedy).
It will be assumed that there are no procedural defects (jurisdiction;
procedures that to the second country look unfamiliar in a bad, un-
fair, unjust way; actual facts in the particular case that created unfair-
ness or bias). If there were, other provisions of the Hague/Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg proposal already provide the loser with leverage to stop
enforcement.
a. Noncontroversial Monetary Damages
The situation where "noncontroversial money damages" are at
stake is likely to be something like this: A party wins a money judg-
ment compensating it for damages suffered because of the other
party's tort or breach of contract. That action happens to have been
in a country where the loser does not have sufficient assets, so the
winner goes to a country where more assets are located. Routine en-
forcement makes sense if the substantive law on liability and on dam-
age calculations is quite similar in both countries. But if the cause of
action has no counterpart in the second country, then the winner
could not have obtained a claim to the loser's second-country assets
by suing in the second country directly. This suggests that equity
might bar enforcement.
Inasmuch as the existence of a counterpart cause of action can
be determined by the second court without having to reopen the
whole proceeding, it seems only fair to permit it to make that deter-
mination. In situations where the claim has no counterpart, but en-
forcement would not rise to the level of a public policy or important
public interest, the draft Hague Convention and the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg proposal would enforce the judgment. In the intellectual
property arena this is not an issue so long as all the signatories are
TRIPs members. In the broader context of the Hague Convention,
the determination of whether there is a counterpart cause of action or
not in the enforcing country could become a frequently contested
point. Additionally, enforcing courts would have to determine
whether a lax standard is a counterpart of an extremely strict stan-
dard, or if they were fundamentally different.
The assumption that these are noncontroversial money damages
means that the method of calculation is not to be a source of great
differences between the two countries involved. If it is, then article
33 of the Hague Convention and article 30 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
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proposal permit downward adjustments of damages to the level that
would have been awarded had the entire action been brought in the
second country.187
b. Controversial Monetary Damages
In most cases, a damage award will not have "rare" damages
unless it also includes "ordinary" damages.188 This suggests that en-
forcement should not be an all-or-nothing proposition.189 A court
should be able, for example, to enforce the compensatory damage
award but not the punitive damage award, if such an award is un-
available in the enforcing country. Hague's article 33 permits just
that.190 The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal has similar, but not identi-
cal, provisions.191 For jurisdictions that abhor punitive damages, the
enforcing court could enforce the entire award less the punitive dam-
ages. Even for simple compensatory damages, there may be different
methods of calculation and some methods of calculation may be ab-
horrent to some countries to such a level that awards are scaled back
prior to enforcement.
c. Final Injunctions
Final injunctions issued by foreign courts are rarely enforced.192
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal assumes enforcement, 93 but then
whittles away at that assumption. Because the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
187. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1088 (art. 30.2(b)); Hague
Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 33.2(b).
188. There are exceptions, such as civil rights cases. Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430
(3d Cir. 2000).
189. Note that this is in direct contrast to the requirement that the court either enforce the
judgment or not enforce the judgment on some substantive or procedural basis, but not retry
the substantive aspects of the case.
190. Hague article 33.1:
A judgment which awards non-compensatory damages, including exemplary or
punitive damages, shall be recognised and enforced to the extent that a court in the
State addressed could have awarded similar or comparable damages. Nothing in this
paragraph shall preclude the court addressed from recognising and enforcing the
judgment under its law for an amount up to the full amount of the damages awarded
by the court of origin.
Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 33.1.
191. It adds the following sentence to article 30.1: "This rule does not apply to damages that
are intended to compensate the plaintiff but without requiring proof of actual damages."
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1087 (art. 30.1).
192. R.W. White, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Equity, 9 SYDNEY L. REv. 630
(1982).
193. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1088 (art. 31) (as distinguished
from preliminary injunctions addressed in article 19).
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proposal starts by requiring that all signatories be TRIPs members,194
and because the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal covers primarily causes
of action under TRIPs,195 there is a reasonable likelihood that the two
countries' laws are similar on most relevant issues. This means that
enforcement of a foreign injunction begins to seem more like en-
forcement of an injunction between states of the US. TRIPs, how-
ever, does not require that final injunctive relief be available, so long
as remuneration is.196 In the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, the en-
forcing court is required to consider whether its laws offer the same
kind of relief: "In no event must a State recognize an award of injunc-
tive relief if such would not be required under the TRIPs agreement,
unless the State addressed would have awarded injunctive relief un-
der the same circumstances."197
The next sentence of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal is more
problematic. It states: "Should the rendering court decline to enter
injunctive relief pursuant to this article, it must award compensatory
damages."198 Although this parallels TRIPs in some ways, injunctions
are generally thought to be appropriate because money cannot ade-
quately compensate for the injury. Requiring a court to calculate a
monetary award when it declines to enter an injunction is likely to
lead to numerous valuation disputes.
As with unusual monetary damages, the best solution for deter-
mining when to enforce a final injunction might be the "existing coun-
terpart" test: enforce if a similar kind of order would be granted were
a suit on the merits instituted in the second country, otherwise do not.
Such a test will (usually) permit the court to reach a decision without
having to adjudicate the underlying facts of the case. It also parallels
the national treatment type analysis for monetary damages. Most
194. Id. at 1074 (art. 1.1).
195. Id. at 1067.
196. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 44, § 2.
197. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1088 (art. 31.2). The number of
negatives in this provision makes it hard to interpret. Stated affirmatively, it says (we think):
Awards of injunctive relief required under the TRIPs Agreement shall be recognized
in all States. Other awards of injunctive relief shall be recognized by other States in
accordance with the same rule that applies to money judgments.
The last phrase relates to the fact that article 30 of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal says
that money judgments will not be recognized unless there is a counterpart damage provision in
the laws of the country of the enforcing court. The "shall" in the second sentence could be a
"may," but if the desire is to force the court to do the analysis, rather than simply to decline
enforcement because of the attractiveness of the loser's overall position or importance in the
second country's society, then "shall" is better. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra
note 5, at 1087-88 (art. 30).
198. Id.
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remedies will thus be granted enforcement, honoring the value of uni-
formity, but pluralism in the law of remedies will also be respected.
d. Preliminary Injunctions
For provisional remedies, the rationale of "judicial economy"
makes much less sense: there has not been a full trial on the merits. If
the second court can properly act in the matter at all, assuming juris-
diction and applicable law, then the plaintiff ought to commence or-
dinary litigation in the second court and move for the provisional
remedy. In such cases, the second court will often have jurisdiction
because the defendant's assets are where the enforcement action is
being brought.
The fact that preliminary injunctions are such a regular feature
of intellectual property litigation may explain why this is a particu-
larly important topic for any treaty related to civil procedure and in-
tellectual property. As of the 2001 draft, it is unclear if the Hague
Convention will support any provisional or protective measures. Pro-
tective measures are discussed in the scope section,199 the jurisdiction
section,00 and the enforcement section.01 Depending on which
bracketed clauses are selected, the result could lead to either en-
forcement of a fairly wide range of preliminary injunctions, or no en-
forcement of foreign preliminary injunctions.02 This is one of the
many complicated and pivotal parts of the Hague Convention nego-
tiations.
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, with its focus on intellectual
property, would permit enforcement of transborder preliminary in-
junctions.
Article 19 Provisional and Protective Measures
3. Courts in other Contracting States not having jurisdiction un-
der paragraphs 1 or 2 may order provisional or protective meas-
ures, provided that-
a. their enforcement is limited to the territory of that State;
and
199. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 1.2(k). If it is covered in the scope
section, the jurisdiction section might be deleted and vice versa. Id. nn. 8, 89.
200. Id. art. 13.
201. Id. art. 23A.
202. See, e.g., id. art. 13, alternative b.
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b. their purpose is to protect on an interim basis a claim on
the merits which is pending or to be brought by the requesting
party.203
Thus, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal would limit a court
without jurisdiction to enforcement in the territory of the State. This
prevents a court not having jurisdiction from issuing a transborder
injunction, such as a pan-European injunction based on a Berne-
copyright. It also requires that the injunction be temporary, pending
the resolution of the underlying case.
Seeking a preliminary injunction should be as easy (or as diffi-
cult) as seeking enforcement of a previously issued foreign prelimi-
nary injunction. This suggests that routine enforcement of foreign
preliminary injunctions should not be very important. And TRIPs
really does not point the other way: TRIPs countries are required to
grant preliminary injunctions as part of the TRIPs enforcement obli-
gation.204 Routinely enforcing foreign preliminary injunctions could
be detrimental to both openness and pluralism. And to the extent
that we want all TRIPs countries' courts to develop expertise in
dealing with the substantive issues of TRIPs, we should encourage
litigants to bring fresh actions in countries where there is infringe-
ment, not enforcement actions.
D. Contracts, and Especially Clickwrap Agreements
Parties negotiating a contract might want to have some of the
benefits of an international convention on jurisdiction and enforce-
ment (routine enforcement, for example, if they expect that their own
behavior will be exemplary but the other side is not as trustworthy).
They will likely, however, prefer not to leave things to chance, and so
will try to specify things by contract that benefit them beyond the law
that would apply in the absence of a contract. For example, two par-
ties from California might decide that they both prefer Nevada law
for a transaction that has some relationship to Nevada, whereas, ab-
sent a contract, California law would have applied.
203. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1084 (art. 19).
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 19 state:
1. The court having jurisdiction under the rules of this Convention to determine the
merits of the case has jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures,
including trans-border injunctions.
2. The courts of a State in which intellectual or tangible property is located have
jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures in respect of that property.
Id.
204. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 50.
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Contracts raise distinct issues from torts because contracts are
binding on the parties and hence raise choice of forum and choice of
law issues that arise from the forum and law being selected in the con-
tract itself. Courts routinely give effect to the "agreed to" terms.205
The choice of law specified in the contract, especially if it is the law of
the chosen forum, may be applied as well.
Within the realm of contracts, there are two types: negotiated
and nonnegotiated. In a traditional negotiated contract between two
parties of relatively equal bargaining strength, the notion of freedom
of contract permits the parties to include these choices. They may be
part of the consideration for the contract, since the choices may pro-
vide a highly valued advantage, or at least convenience, to one of the
parties. They also provide predictability: both parties benefit from
knowing in advance the laws that will apply.
The second type of contract, the nonnegotiable contract, also
sometimes called a contract of adhesion, does not permit negotiation.
Examples of these include the text on the back of the ticket when you
park in an automated garage and the license that falls out of the box
when you open a new software package.
The web has seen the creation of a new kind of nonnegotiable
contract-the "clickwrap" agreement. 206  Like any other contract,
clickwrap contracts may establish some of the parameters of future
litigation, in particular choice of forum and choice of law. But click-
wrap contracts are different from negotiated contracts. They gener-
ally fit the definition of a "contract of adhesion"207 although they
need not be limited to "consumers" 208 but instead are between parties
of unequal bargaining strength, and drafted entirely by the stronger
one.209 If the weaker party does not want to "leave it"-or is paying
205. Of course, if a party asserts fraud, duress, or any of the other traditional reasons not to
enforce a contract, the provisions may be nullified-but if the nullification is asserted as a
defense, rather than in a declaratory judgment action in a forum chosen by the would-be
nullifier, then chances are the action will have been brought in the forum specified in the
contract.
206. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995). Clickwrap is distinguished from browsewrap because clickwrap
licenses require some affirmative, if nominal, assent, while browsewrap licenses might state
contractual language, such as in a link on a website, without requiring affirmative assent to
those terms.
207. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "contract of adhesion" as
"standardized contract forms offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially 'take it
or leave it' basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain").
208. See infra Subsection IV.D.2.
209. If someone in a big corporation encounters a clickwrap contract for something the
corporation may want to use or buy in quantity, the corporation may simply contact the owner
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no attention to the terms, since they seem unlikely ever to matter-it
manifests its assent2t0 by clicking a button that says, "I agree."
Should it turn out that terms did matter, the clicking party might
be stuck with the forum, and choice of law, that the web-owner speci-
fied. There are many reasons for drafters to choose a particular fo-
rum or law for those clauses. They might choose to have the forum
be one that is hard to reach (the South Pole, say, or Tahiti-pleasant
for the programmers and even for any defendant rich enough and idle
enough to be able to participate in a trial). Or they might choose to
locate in a jurisdiction with the most favorable laws for some aspect
of its business-a data haven if initially the drafters' business is built
on possibly-infringing uses of someone else's intellectual property. In
those situations, the drafters' choice of the home forum will have a
legitimate relationship to the transaction, but will still have a bad
odor, leaving the scent of nonnegotiation.
Defendants may then challenge the clickwrap terms, asking the
court to refuse enforcement of the contract, or at least to strike the
offending terms, on the grounds of lack of assent, 211 unconscionabil-
ity,212 or violating the public policy of the state. 21 3 US courts have
started struggling with these issues and, so far, have come out both
ways.214
Standard form contracts may not seem like objects worthy of
deepest sympathy, but they are efficient for the drafters and the busi-
nesses using them. The efficiencies (and comfort level) these con-
of the clickwrap item and negotiate a special deal -a site license or a block purchase of a large
number of licenses-and may be able to bargain for different litigation specifications. Even
large corporations, however, have employees who use off-the-shelf software for a specific task,
one that is not performed widely for the business. In such cases, the corporation faces the same
situation as the consumer.
210. It is unclear at what point the standard for assent is met. For example, is clicking "I
agree" sufficient to reach the level of assent? This is likely to remain a domestic issue with
transborder implications.
211. Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389 at *1 (N.D. Cal.).
212. To reach this threshold of unconscionability, the term must "shock the conscience." "It
is to be emphasized that a contract of adhesion is not unconscionable per se, and that all
unconscionable contracts are not contracts of adhesion. Nonetheless, the more standardized the
agreement and the less a party may bargain meaningfully, the more susceptible the contract or a
term will be to a claim of unconscionability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
(1981).
213. Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. App. 2001) (denying
enforcement of choice of forum clause selecting Virginia due to concerns that Virginia does not
offer the same consumer protections as California).
214. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software
Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 308-09 (Wash. 2000) (all enforcing the license terms). But see Klocek v.
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1335 (D. Kan. 2000).
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tracts provide may in the longer run contribute to the variety and
plenty of products and services available to other businesses and con-
sumers, a social benefit to all. Thus, the terms of standard form con-
tracts should be binding like any other contract's terms, and standard
clauses should be interpreted the same way regardless of the identity
of the other party. If the interpretation varies based on later-
occurring facts peculiar to specific defendants, their status or the way
they use the product, the benefits of having standard form contracts
may be reduced.
1. The Hague Convention
Against this backdrop, the Hague Convention addresses con-
tracts in several locations, notably articles 4 (Choice of Court), 6 (Ju-
risdiction), 7 (Consumer Contracts), and 8 (Individual Contracts of
Employment). In addition, one of the prohibited grounds of jurisdic-
tion is "the signing in that State of the contract from which the dis-
pute arises."215 Article 4 states that if a choice of court is made in a
contract, that forum has exclusive jurisdiction. One important excep-
tion to the exclusive jurisdiction in article 4 is if it is a "consumer con-
tract" as defined in article 7,216 in which case the jurisdiction is the
consumer's domicile, whether the consumer is a plaintiff or a defen-
dant.
Article 7 draws, in part, on the Rome Convention,27 which gov-
erns judicial action resolving contract disputes among citizens of the
European Community. Both define limitations when such contracts
are between businesses and consumers.218 The reasoning is that sub-
stantive and procedural terms in a contract that a consumer has no
reason to know about because they are "regarded as being outside his
trade or profession... "219 should not be enforced against him.220
215. Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 18.2(j).
216. A consumer contract is a "contract for a purpose which is outside its trade or
profession, hereafter designated as the consumer." Hague Convention, 1999 Draft, supra note
1, art. 7.1. The 2001 draft amended it to define it as a "contract[] between a natural person
acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Hague Convention, 2001 Draft,
supra note 1, art. 7.1.
217. EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 266 O.J. 1 (1980)
(commonly known as the Rome Convention). It also draws on the Brussels Convention, supra
note 107, arts. 13-15.
218. See Hague Convention, 2001 Draft, supra note 1, art. 7.
219. Rome Convention, supra note 217, art. 5.1 ("This Article applies to a contract the
object of which is the supply of goods or services to a person ('the consumer') for a purpose
which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of
credit for that object.").
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For standard form contracts presented to web customers via
software, software could also be used to restore at least some of
whatever the contract drafter might otherwise lose because of an in-
ternational legal system that gives consumers special rights.21
2. The Problem of Consumer Contracts
The Hague Convention does not distinguish between negotiated
and nonnegotiated contracts. To the extent that clickwrap agree-
ments are often used in electronic contexts, it is hard for a contracting
business to know it is contracting with a consumer, a nonprofit, or a
Fortune 500 corporation. Additionally, if a consumer licenses the
work for consumer use and then starts using the product for a home
business, the consumer treatment of Article 7 could be lost.
The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal explicitly rejects the notion of
consumer contracts222 and we agree. The idea of a special rule for
contracts between businesses and consumers is not all that adaptable
to the world of clickwrap licensing. It presupposes that a web busi-
ness, as it drafts a clickwrap contract and floats it into the stream of
commerce to find some takers, actually knows who will use the sub-
ject matter of the contract, and how they will use it. The drafter of a
clickwrap license has no idea, however, who will be doing the click-
ing, or why, and may not even know (in the sense of knowing by hu-
man intelligence, apart from software bookkeeping) until well after
the fact that there was a click at all. If three people take a clickwrap
license, the first may be using the subject matter of the license for
personal use, the next may be an individual using it in connection
with a home office, and the third may be in business. Drawing the
line to encircle only consumers using a web-based item for personal
use is tricky.
For the clickwrap drafters, this loss of predictability might be
manageable. By the time they have made the decision to institute
suit, they will very likely know whether or not the potential defendant
was a consumer using the licensed subject matter for household use.
If the potential defendant will receive the protection of article 7, the
220. Brussels Convention, supra note 107, arts. 13-15.
221. If the Rome Convention, supra note 217, rule were in effect, the clickwrap window
could be preceded by a window that said "Are you a consumer who will use this for personal
use?" and then the software would branch. The program could offer a contract optimized for
consumer rules for those who answer "Yes" and a contract optimized for business rules for
those who answer "No."
222. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1102.
[Vol. 77:1213
2002] INT'L JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 1289
plaintiff can forget about the (unenforceable) choice of law provision
and institute the suit where jurisdiction over the defendant is proper.
Or, if the choice of forum provision is very important to winning, the
plaintiff can tough it out, in hopes that a novel legal argument on its
own part, early settlement, a less than thorough or not so skillful de-
fense by the defendant, or the vagaries of litigation, will protect the
choice of forum provision from any challenge.
Article 7 leaves unprotected many businesses, as well as non-
profit institutions such as universities and libraries, subjecting
them-but not consumers-to possibly egregious provisions when in
fact everyone uses the web-provided item in the same way, and with
the same inability to negotiate a fairer bargain than what the click-
wrap specifies.
Consumers, universities, libraries, and businesses are not in a po-
sition to negotiate every clickwrap contract, nor are they able to as-
sume the risk of having to go to a foreign forum. They may have
legitimate, indeed weighty, defenses in a lawsuit on the clickwrap li-
cense such as first sale, fair use, and other rights. Still, those for
whom article 7 provides no protection may be well advised to do
without clickwrap products and services.
A more desirable solution for both the clickwrap drafters and the
clickwrap users would be to have a rule about whether to give effect
to clickwrap litigation specifications (a shorthand term for choice of
law and choice of forum clauses) that was based on the text and type
of the license, rather than the initially unknowable attributes of a po-
tential adversary and the initially unknowable type of use.
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, not oth-
erwise known for its elegance and consumer-friendliness, takes a bet-
ter approach to defining the group of contracts that get some kind of
special consumer-oriented treatment when it defines "mass-market
transaction." 223 The Hague Convention would meet the objections of
223. See, for example, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA),
Section 102(45) (2001 Draft); not otherwise a model of intelligent draftsmanship, UCITA at
least does not suffer from the Rome Convention's defect when it defines a "mass-market
transaction":
(45) "Mass-market transaction" means a transaction that is:
(A) a consumer contract; or
(B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if:
(i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed to the
general public as a whole, including consumers, under substantially the same terms for
the same information;
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business concerning predictability and uniformity of the judicial in-
terpretation of litigation specifications in clickwrap licenses if it were
to define something like a mass-market clickwrap. The result, how-
ever, would be that when a mass-market clickwrap product or service
was licensed by another business, or an individual for sole-proprietor
business use, the rules would be the same as if the person clicking was
a consumer making personal use of the clickwrapped item.
Of course, if the public-whether consumers alone or joined by
small businesses and nonprofits -begins to pay attention to choice of
law and choice of forum provisions in clickwrap contracts and refuses
to click, such provisions may begin to disappear. This is an unlikely
result in today's world because a person would have to read each
agreement. In the future, however, we might have electronic
agents224 contracting for us and they might be able to take such ac-
tions and alter business patterns through market forces. Additionally,
if opposition to the very idea of these terms gains media attention
through a few vivid examples, reforms might be accomplished
through legislation.
3. The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal and Contracts Governing
Intellectual Property Transactions
Whether or not a mass-market transaction concept is adopted in
the Convention, the problem of when to invalidate choice of forum
clauses remains. Although not addressed in the draft Hague Conven-
tion, it is addressed in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal. This is un-
surprising because intellectual property contracts are frequently
clickwrap agreements, necessitating a rule to determine when the
clause is enforceable. In the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, the rele-
vant article is article 4, Choice of Court. It includes an important sec-
(ii) the licensee acquires the information or informational rights in a retail
transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a
retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not:
(I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or public display of a
copyrighted work;
(II) a transaction in which the information is customized or otherwise specially
prepared by the licensor for the licensee, other than minor customization using a
capability of the information intended for that purpose;
(III) a site license; or
(IV) an access contract.
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ucita/ucita0l.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
224. Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1130 (2000).
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tion, article 4.3 on nonnegotiated contracts, which are defined as
those "arising in transactions for information products where the
terms are entirely pre-packaged." 225 The phrase "information prod-
ucts" reflects the fact that the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal is limited
to intellectual property matters.226
The proposal sets forth a multifactor balancing test for deter-
mining when to give effect to choice of forum clauses in such nonne-
gotiated contracts:
Article 4. Agreements Pertaining to Choice of Court ...
3. In nonnegotiated contracts, an agreement within the mean-
ing of paragraph 1227 shall be valid if the designated Contracting
State or forum is reasonable in light of-
a. the location of the non-contract-drafting party,
b. the availability of online dispute resolution or other forms
of virtual representation,
c. the resources of the parties; in particular, of the non-
contract-drafting party,
d. the sophistication of the parties; in particular, of the non-
contract-drafting party,
e. the substantiality of the connection between the designated
forum, and the parties or the substance of the dispute, including
whether the designated forum would have had jurisdiction over the
non-drafting party in the absence of a forum-selection clause
f. for registered rights, whether the designated forum was es-
tablished by the State to foster expertise in adjudicating disputes of
this type.
g. whether the terms of the agreement were sufficiently ap-
parent with respect to accessibility, typographic readability, and na-
tional language so as not to cause surprise.228
Clickwrap contracts appear to be especially vulnerable with re-
gard to factors (a), (c), (d), (e) and, of course, (g). Factor (f), ad-
dressing the designated forum for registered rights, is relevant to
countries where an agency has been charged with making specific
adjudications and the agreement circumvents that agency's authority
and expertise.
225. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1103.
226. See supra Section I.B.
227. Paragraph 1 does not define "choice of forum" agreements. It recites a rule-that such
agreements shall confer jurisdiction (emphasis ours). While 4.1 in view of 4.3 can be understood
to mean that in nonnegotiated contracts, automatic enforcement is not the rule, this is unclear.
228. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1075-76 (art. 4).
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4. Simplifying the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal Multifactor Test
Article 4.3 addresses an important concern, but its approach,
elaborating several factors upon which to judge reasonableness, is
problematic. Different courts applying different weights to the dif-
ferent factors could easily come to different results. A single broad
statement might better meet the needs of judges faced with new situa-
tions, new technology, and new substantive laws in unfamiliar forums.
A simpler version of Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal article 4.3
would just stop with the word "reasonable":
In a nonnegotiated contract, a "choice of forum" provision shall be
valid if the designated Contracting State or forum is reasonable.
If the Commentary referred to the multiple factors specified in the
current version, as well as ideas behind the Rome Convention,229 the
Uniform Commercial Code,230 and even UCITA,231 that would guide
a court to understand what was "reasonable" without etching those
factors in stone.
A stronger alternative might say something like:
In nonnegotiated contracts, "choice of forum" provisions cannot
independently confer jurisdiction.
This means that the jurisdiction chosen would have to be proper un-
der the jurisdictional rules of the Convention. For example, if a con-
tract specifies Argentina as the forum, but Argentina would not
otherwise be able to assert jurisdiction, we would require Argentina
to decline jurisdiction. This formulation essentially adopts Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg article 4.3(e)(2), but inverts it to permit jurisdiction only
when there is another basis for it. Permissive language, encouraging
courts to decline jurisdiction, instead of prohibitive language, forbid-
ding them from asserting it, could lead to de facto enforcement of al-
most all such clauses. If an escape hatch were necessary, a phrase
could be added at the end of the sentence such as: "unless there is no
forum that has jurisdiction [for the odd case where somehow what the
defendants do and where they do it mean that nowhere in the world
can they be sued]" or "except when such jurisdiction or [giving effect
to such agreement] is in the public interest."
229. See supra note 217.
230. See generally Amelia Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in
Choosing Applicable Law and Forum Under Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 32 INT'L LAW. 1067 (1998).
231. Supra note 223.
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Would it harm predictability to have a rule that nonnegotiated
forum choices would never be enforced? Depending on whether the
idea of a mass-market transaction replaces the idea of a consumer
contract, it is unclear how much jurisdictional latitude clickwrap
drafters will have in enforcing choice of forum clauses.
If consumer contracts are expanded to encompass all mass-mar-
ket transactions and the exclusive jurisdiction remains the domicile of
the nondrafting party, the number of times Dreyfuss-Ginsburg pro-
posal 4.3 will have to be applied will ideally decrease, driving those
who want to choose another forum to negotiate the contract.
5. Clickwrap Choice of Law Clauses
Unlike the Hague Convention, which does not address choice of
law clauses, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal includes an exception
that permits nonenforcement if the choice of law chosen by the origi-
nal court was "arbitrary or unreasonable."232 In the context of con-
tracts, the question is whether a court choosing a law solely on the
basis of the choice of law clause would be considered "arbitrary or
unreasonable." We would hope that the inquiry would consider the
nature of the contract formation in determining whether or not the
choice of law met the standard.
Article 25.1(h) continues: "The conformity of the forum to the
jurisdictional terms of this Convention does not necessarily, of itself,
suffice to establish a significant relationship between its laws and
the233 dispute."
The effect of this sentence is to prevent a forum that has jurisdic-
tion from applying its own law when that law does not bear a signifi-
cant relationship to the dispute.
We would suggest a parallel sentence in addition to this one,
stating something like:
In nonnegotiated contracts, "choice of law" agreements do not, in-
dependent of other factors, create a sufficient relationship between
the chosen laws and the dispute.234
232. Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention, supra note 5, at 1086 (art. 25.1); see also supra
text accompanying note 150.
233. We propose inserting the phrase "facts of the" here.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09.
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V. CONCLUSION
Harmonizing bases of jurisdiction and making enforcement of
foreign judgments routine threatens the relevance of domestic laws in
an interconnected world. By relying on the four guideposts of uni-
formity, predictability, pluralism, and openness, the Hague Conven-
tion can achieve the proper balance, providing for the redress of
electronic wrongs without stifling innovation and national experimen-
tation. The technology itself, assisted by governmental actions, may
permit private parties to protect their rights, especially copyright,
without having to resort to civil litigation, thus undermining the im-
portance of the Hague Convention. The ability and flexibility of the
web and its users around the world, however, may lead to greater re-
liance on the balance found in an improved Hague Convention or
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal. This suggests that we are not at a dead
end, but at a new beginning.
